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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I examine people’s orientations to their own and each 
other’s  “deontic  rights”—that  is,  rights  to  determine  actions.  Drawing  on  
fifteen video-recorded church workplace meetings between pastors and 
cantors as data, and conversation analysis as a theoretical and 
methodological framework, I consider how participants establish and 
negotiate their own and each other’s deontic rights in the turn-by-turn 
sequential unfolding of interaction. The dissertation consists of six original 
articles and an introduction, in which I introduce the central concepts of the 
study, describe my data and method, provide an overview of the results of the 
study, and discuss the ways in which my study contributes to our 
understanding of social interaction. 
In my analyses, I consider deontic rights from two different angles. 
First, I describe how participants in interaction may claim (and mitigate their 
claims of) deontic rights by virtue of their interactional conduct: in Article 1, I 
examine the participants’ ways of dealing with those claims of deontic rights 
that arise from their participation in an encounter and, in Articles 2-4, I 
consider how participants in joint decision making manage to establish and 
maintain the symmetrical distribution of deontic rights at different sequential 
loci. Second, I discuss the ways in which participants may deploy their 
deontic rights as interactional resources, as they design their communicative 
actions so as to be recognizable as such. The central argument presented in 
Articles 5 and 6 is that, instead of always needing to claim their deontic rights 
(deontic stance), participants may also trust in their co-participants being 
aware of, and taking into account, these rights (deontic status). It is thus the 
complementarity and relative weight of deontic stances and deontic statuses 
that  constitutes  a  fundamental  mechanism  by  which  people  may  engage  in  
tough power negotiations without yet causing any overt face threats. 
The study highlights the significance of face-to-face interaction as a 
locus of social order and seeks to enhance our understanding of the linkages 
between the local and wider aspects of social organization that pertain to 
people’s interactional conduct. 
 
 
 
  
 8 
 
LIST OF ORIGINAL ARTICLES 
Article 1: 
Stevanovic, Melisa (2013). Managing participation in interaction: The case of 
humming. Text & Talk 33(1): 113-137. 
 
Article 2: 
Stevanovic, Melisa (2013). Constructing a proposal as a thought: A way to 
manage problems in the initiation of joint decision-making in Finnish 
workplace interaction. Pragmatics 23(3). 
 
Article 3: 
Stevanovic, Melisa (2012). Establishing joint decisions in a dyad. Discourse 
Studies 14(6): 779-803. 
 
Article 4: 
Stevanovic, Melisa (2012). Prosodic salience and the emergence of new 
decisions: On the prosody of approval in Finnish workplace interaction. 
Journal of Pragmatics 44(6-7): 843-862. 
 
Article 5: 
Stevanovic, Melisa & Peräkylä, Anssi (2012). Deontic authority in interaction: 
The right to announce, propose and decide. Research on Language and 
Social Interaction 45(3): 297-321. 
 
Article 6: 
Stevanovic,  Melisa  &  Peräkylä,  Anssi  (submitted).  Three  orders  in  the  
organization of human action: On the interface between knowledge, 
power,  and  emotion  in  interaction  and  social  relationships.  Submitted  
to Language in Society (second, revised version). 
 
 
 
  
 9 
 
TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS AND GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS 
Transcription symbols 
.  pitch fall  
?  pitch rise  
,  level pitch  
??  marked pitch movement 
underlining emphasis 
-  truncation 
[ ]  overlap 
=  latching of turns 
(0.5)  pause (length in tenths of a second) 
(.)  micropause 
:  lengthening of a sound 
hhh audible out-breath  
.hhh audible in-breath  
(h)  within-speech aspiration, usually indicating laughter  
€  smiley voice quality 
#  creaky voice quality 
° whisper 
?? humming or singing 
@ other change in voice quality 
mt, tch, krhm vocal noises 
<word> slow speech rate 
>word< fast speech rate 
 
 
Glossing abbreviations 
PL  plural 
1, 2 person 
0 zero person 
GEN genetive 
PAR partitive 
ESS essive 
TRA translative 
INE inessive 
ELA elative 
ILL illative 
ADE adessive 
 10 
 
ABL ablative 
ALL allative 
INS instructive 
ACC accusative 
COMP comparative 
INF infinitive 
COND conditional 
IMP imperative 
CLI clitic 
Q question clitic 
NEG negation  
PASS passive 
PST past tense 
PPC past participle 
PPPC passive past participle 
POSS possessive suffix 
 
Singular, third person, nominative, active and present tense are forms that 
have been considered unmarked. These have not been glossed. 
 
 
 
  
 11 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Object of the study 
This dissertation is about people’s rights to determine their own and others’ 
actions—something that I refer to as “deontic rights.” The knowledge of 
having such rights is an important part of any individual’s sense of self-
integrity. Besides, and above all, deontic rights constitute a fundamental 
aspect of our social relations, namely who we are to each other. Thereby, our 
deontic rights are essentially connected to our interactions with other people. 
For  example,  while  someone  can  be  a  boss  on  the  basis  of  her  institutional  
position and thus have deontic rights with respect to her subordinates’ 
actions, it is through the interactions with her subordinates that these deontic 
rights are actually established and the institutional role of the boss is “talked 
into being” (Heritage 1984: 290). Still, the superior position of the boss can 
make it relatively easy for her to get her subordinates to cooperate with her in 
establishing her deontic rights. In other words, deontic rights, as constituents 
of our social relations, both shape our interactions with other people and are 
shaped by them. These two sides of deontic rights are the red thread running 
through this study: I examine how participants’ deontic rights are established 
on a moment-by-moment basis during the course of their face-to-face 
interactional encounters and how participants’ orientations to their own and 
each  other’s  deontic  rights  bear  on  the  options  available  to  them  to  design  
their interactional conduct. Simply put, I consider deontic rights both as 
interactional achievements and as interactional resources. 
From the  perspective  of  studying  people’s  deontic  rights,  certain  types  
of  interactions  are  more  fruitful  than  others.  When  people’s  orientations  to  
each other’s deontic rights are highly conventionalized, these orientations 
may remain mostly unnoticed. But when these orientations involve 
incongruences, they become visible. Such incongruences are especially 
obvious in those workplace interactions where the participants’ professional 
roles have become blurred due to the structural changes in some 
occupational  domains.  In  this  study,  I  examine  these  kinds  of  interactions.  
My data are drawn from the planning meetings between pastors and cantors 
in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland. Given the traditional 
authority of the clergy in the Christian church and society, on the one hand, 
and the contemporary workplace climate that places emphasis on teamwork 
and cooperation, on the other hand, the relationship between pastors and 
cantors has become ambiguous. While the rector is superior to the cantor, the 
hierarchy  between  cantors  and  “ordinary”  parish  pastors  is  not  clear.  While  
the public work tasks of pastors and cantors are defined in the Church Order, 
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it is especially the rights concerning the preparation of church events, which 
are relatively indistinct. The planning meetings between pastors and cantors 
provide, therefore, an excellent insight into the ways in which participants’ 
sometimes conflicting orientations to their own and each other’s deontic 
rights are displayed in their interactional conduct. 
In face-to-face interactional encounters, participants’ deontic rights 
concern two major domains of action. First, participants may have deontic 
rights with respect to specific decisions (e.g., where to go for a dinner, what to 
buy as a present for a marrying couple, which hymn to take as the Opening 
Hymn of the mass). It is not self-evident that each participant in an 
encounter has an equal right to make such choices, but the exact distribution 
of deontic rights between the participants is something to be established 
cooperatively in interaction. Second, participants may have deontic rights 
with regard to certain choices in the interaction then and there (e.g., when to 
initiate  a  new sequence,  whether  to  provide  an  answer  to  an  uncomfortable  
question, how to terminate the whole encounter). Even if the local structures 
of interaction may democratize the participants’ social relations to some 
extent (for further discussion of the topic, see Section 4.4), they may still have 
different degrees of freedom to make such choices—a matter that is, again, 
managed through cooperative interactional practices. Thus, in both of these 
major domains of action, the participants’ ways of establishing and 
negotiating their deontic rights are essentially linked to the fundamentally 
cooperative  human  communication  system.  In  this  study,  I  highlight  one  
particular  aspect  of  this  system  which  is  particularly  important  from  the  
point of view of participants’ deontic rights: instead of always needing to 
claim their deontic rights, participants may also trust in their co-participants 
being aware of, and taking into account, these rights. 
Being aware of, and taking into account, the co-participants’ deontic 
rights—even when these rights are not demonstrated in the design of their co-
participants’ utterances—can be crucial for action recognition, that is, for the 
process in which one participant comes to understand what social actions 
their co-participants’ utterances and expressions are meant to convey. 
Thereby, the participants can deploy their deontic rights as interactional 
resources when they design their communicative actions so as to be 
recognizable as such by their co-participants. In other words, participants 
may, to varying degrees, already in advance count on their co-participants’ 
cooperation in establishing their deontic rights and in taking these rights into 
account in the process of action recognition. While someone’s legitimate 
authority is associated with others’ cooperation, the fact that someone has 
lost  her  authority  becomes  apparent  when  others  cease  to  cooperate  in  the  
way described. This cooperation-based mechanism that informs the 
processes of action formation and action recognition, I argue, allows people 
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to engage in tough power negotiations without yet causing any overt threat to 
the participants’ faces. 
It is this interplay between authority and cooperation that I aim to 
describe  in  this  study;  each  of  the  attached  articles  deals  with  one  or  more  
interactional practices or patterns that are relevant in this regard. In this way, 
the study highlights the significance of face-to-face interaction as a locus of 
social order and seeks to enhance our understanding of the linkages between 
the local and wider aspects of social organization that pertain to people’s 
interactional conduct. 
In what follows, I will introduce the central concepts of this study and, 
in so doing, set the frame for my subsequent discussion on deontic rights. I 
will start by outlining a big picture of “power” in human social life and, 
thereafter, concentrate more specifically on the notions of “authority” and 
“deontic authority.” Then, after having discussed the phenomenon of 
“cooperation,”  I  will  introduce  the  notion  of  “deontic  rights”  as  the  central  
focus of this study and formulate my research question. 
 
 
1.2 Power in human social life 
Human social existence is permeated by power. It is an essential feature of 
social organization in all forms of political, organizational, and institutional 
life; it is “a basic force in social relationships” (Keltner et al. 2003: 265). 
Russel (1938: 10) has even claimed that the “laws of social dynamics are laws 
which can only be stated in terms of power.” But what is power? According to 
Lukes (1978: 634), the common core to all conceptions of power is the notion 
of bringing about consequences. One celebrated definition comes from Weber 
(1978:  53),  who  regarded  power  as  “the  probability  that  one  actor  within  a  
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Power is 
thus centrally involved in human agency: the person who exercises power 
could have acted otherwise, and the person over whom power is exercised 
would have acted otherwise had not power been exercised (Giddens 1979: 
91). Besides producing changes in overt behavior, power may also alter 
people’s psychological states, such as their targets of attraction (Lewin 1938; 
Festinger 1950). And, of course, the notion of bringing about consequences is 
abstract enough to encompass also those consequences that involve the 
physical world only, such as a hole in the ground as a result of my digging it. 
But  what  is  specific  in  the  instances  of  “social  power”  (Cartwright  1959;  
French & Raven 1959; Mann 1986)—something that social scientists are 
interested in—is the idea of getting people to  think  or  act  in  line  with  one’s  
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desires, beliefs, orders, instructions, commands, suggestions, and so on, in 
order to have an impact on the world through these people.1 While such an 
impact can involve the enactment of decisions, the suppression of issues from 
becoming “decisionable” in the first place, and influencing people in terms of 
their motivations, interests, and beliefs (Lukes 2005), it is clear that the more 
people, groups, and organizations one can get to act according to one’s will, 
and  the  bigger  the  consequences  that  one  can  thus  bring  about,  the  greater  
the power one has. 
Inasmuch as power is thus to be seen as a “disposition concept” (Eskola 
1961: 13)—that is, as something that a person or a group of people may 
possess2—we may ask several questions: Why is it that some people appear to 
have  more  power  than  others?  What,  or  who,  determines  the  balance  of  
power  in  a  society?  (Tannenbaum 1946;  Dembitz  1971;  Rothchild  &  Roeder  
2005).3 What is it that power elites, members of upper classes, high-status 
professionals, and representatives of institutional power have that other 
people lack? Social scientific research literature provides many different 
kinds of answers to these questions, and the answers point to different levels 
of social organization. Thus, discussing macrostructures, Mann (1986), for 
example, has suggested that the principal “sources” of power have to do with 
the control over economic, ideological, military, and political resources. 
Moving towards a more macro-interactional level, French and Raven (1959) 
have proposed a model where there are five different bases of power: reward 
power is based on the perceived ability to provide positive consequences and 
remove negative ones, referent power is a result of personal liking, legitimate 
power stems from the belief  that  someone has the right to issue commands 
and expect obedience from others, coercive power is based on the capacity of 
someone to punish others for noncompliance, and expert power is a result of 
a difference in the knowledge level of two individuals in a particular area. In a 
similar vein, Eskola (1961) has identified two main sources of power that 
prevail in dyadic decision making: social likability and task ability. 
                                                        
1 From  this  point  of  view,  the  concept  of  power  is  related  to  what  has  been  called  “social  
influence” in the social psychological research literature (Turner 2005; Eskola 1961; Turner 
1991; Pfeffer 1992; Ng & Bradac 1993; Forgas & Williams 2001; Spears et al. 2001). 
2 In  this  respect,  the  concept  of  power  is  seen  differently,  for  example,  in  the  Foucauldian  
tradition,  where  the  researchers’  interests  usually  lie  in  the  ways  in  which  language  and  
discourse are ideologically shaped by relations of power in society (see e.g., Foucault 1980; 
McHoul & Grace 1993; Miller & Rose 2008; Vrecko 2009). 
3 Of  course,  this  kind  of  question  does  not  make  sense  from  the  point  of  view  of  those  
conceptions of power where power is seen as a collective capacity or achievement (Lukes 
1978:  636).  According  to  those  views,  the  gaining  of  power  by  someone  does  not  occur  at  
others’ expense but, instead, increases the total amount of power in the whole community. 
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It is the bases of power that determine what actually needs to be done 
for someone’s power to become effective. According to Turner (2005), there 
are three possibilities for this: “coercion,” “persuasion,” and “authority.” 
Coercion  can  be  defined  as  an  attempt  to  control  someone  against  his  will  
and self-interest through the deployment of human and material resources to 
constrain his behavior. It is an inherently conflictual attempt at control, given 
that  one  cannot  influence  the  other  person  in  any  other  way  (Turner  2005:  
12). Coercion is thus the weakest form of social power, understood as getting 
others to act as an extension of one’s will. That the opposite is frequently 
thought is because the consequences of coercion can be extreme and 
dramatic.  Certainly,  destroying  an  enemy  is  a  sign  of  great  power,  but  it  is  
also a confession of complete failure in terms of influencing and controlling 
the actions of the enemy (Turner 2005: 13). Inasmuch as others cannot help 
but try to cope with the situation, we may indeed talk about a specific form of 
coercion. Persuasion is quite different from coercion. It can be defined as an 
attempt to get others to think or act in line with one’s desires by providing 
reasons why the desired judgment, decision, belief or action is correct, right, 
moral, and appropriate (Turner 2005: 6). Importantly, if one can persuade 
others of the correctness of some belief or the rightness of some action, then 
others  are  likely  to  act  on  it  as  a  matter  of  their  own  volition,  as  free,  
intrinsically motivated and willing agents (Turner 2005: 8). 
Now, it is the notions of coercion and persuasion against which we may 
highlight  the  specific  features  of  the  third  way  in  which  power  can  operate:  
authority—a  central  topic  of  this  study,  and  one  which  will  be  discussed  in  
more detail below. While authority involves the acceptance of someone’s 
right  to  prescribe  what  should  be  thought  or  done,  it  is  something  quite  
different from coercion. Indeed, coercion is triggered precisely by the lack of 
authority and it undermines the remaining authority even further (Turner 
2005:  12).  Therefore,  wherever  possible,  people  try  to  disguise  coercion  as  
legitimate authority and minimize the threat to other people’s perceived 
freedom (Turner 2005: 16). But just as little as with coercion, authority has to 
do  with  persuasion.  Authority  is  a  “shortcut  where  reason  is  presumed  to  
lead” (Lukes 1978: 640); it does not by definition require persuasion. People 
with  authority  have  the  right  to  prescribe  what  should  be  thought  or  done,  
but they do not have the obligation to convince others that this particular 
belief or action is right (Turner 2005: 8). In reality, the need to persuade only 
implies the lack of authority.  
In sum, power—or social power, more specifically—is about getting 
people,  groups,  and  organizations  to  act  according  to  one’s  will.  While  the  
bases of power may vary, they have an impact on what actually needs to be 
done  for  someone’s  power  to  become  effective:  if  the  power  is  based  on  
nothing else than, for example, control over military resources, it may be 
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coercion that is needed; but if the power stems, for example, from someone’s 
inside knowledge in a certain domain, it may be persuasion that works best. 
While both coercion and persuasion involve a person trying to influence other 
people one-sidedly, there is one form of social power—authority—whose 
effectiveness is essentially based on other people’s attitudes and behavior—
something that brings us to our next topic. 
 
 
1.3 Authority 
1.3.1 On the concept of authority 
“Authority” as a moral and political notion has been comprehensively 
explored in the fields of philosophical, sociological, and social psychological 
inquiry.  It  refers  to  the  right  of  a  person  to  expect  another  person’s  
compliance  (Weber  1978;  Zelditch  &  Walker  1984).  To  have  authority  over  
another is to have the right to demand certain actions of the other, regardless 
of  the  other’s  personal  opinions.  People  with  authority  have  the  right  to  
allocate tasks, direct performance, set criteria, inspect and evaluate 
performance, and allocate sanctions on the basis of performance (Dornbusch 
& Scott 1975; Zelditch & Walker 1984). Still, authority is not merely about 
giving orders and commands but it involves an exercise of power that is 
regarded as legitimate by those subject to it (Wild 1974; Lukes 1978: 649). 
Authority is based on the fact that someone accepts another person’s right to 
prescribe his beliefs, attitudes, or actions. Because of such voluntary 
deference to authority, it is not experienced as an oppression of self but as 
submission to something with which one nevertheless identifies, such as the 
values of a community (Tyler & Degoey 1995). As pointed out above, one may 
not be persuaded that something is right but one is convinced that some 
person,  group  or  role  has  the  right  to  prescribe  it,  by  virtue  of  her  position  
within  the  group  structure  and  by  virtue  of  the  group  norms  and  values  
(Turner 2005: 8). Authority involves the “surrender of private judgment” 
(Lukes 1978: 639-640). To accept authority is to refrain from examining what 
one is being told to do or believe. Instead, it is to act or believe on the basis of 
a second-order reason that requires one precisely to disregard the balance of 
reasons as one sees it. Consequently, to exercise authority is not to have to 
offer reasons, but to be obeyed or believed because of authority. 
Bochenski  (1974)  describes  authority  as  a  triadic  relation  consisting  of  
“the bearer” of authority (someone, x, who is said to have authority), “the 
subject” of authority (someone, y, for whom the bearer is an authority), and 
“the field” (class of entities, ?, in which x has authority for y). Besides 
emphasizing the importance of the subject of authority in acknowledging the 
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bearer of authority as such, this definition points to another important 
feature of authority: the authoritative power is always restricted to specific 
domains;  no  one,  except  God  perhaps,  has  authority  in  every  possible  field  
(Bochenski  1974:  69).  For  example,  as  pointed  out  in  one  of  the  articles  of  
this  study,  “an  individual  professor  may  have  the  right  to  decide  about  the  
questions she will ask on an exam, but she might not have the right to decide 
what  books  the  exam  is  about,  and  she  has  absolutely  no  right  to  decide  
whether the student will travel on foot, by bus or by bicycle to take the exam” 
(see Article 5). While people are regularly expected to possess authoritative 
knowledge about their biography, relationship histories, and personal 
experiences, in some institutional settings, such as in psychotherapy, even 
this may not be self-evident. Likewise, people’s legitimate right to decide 
about their daily routines, including dressing, eating, and sleeping, can vary 
with respect to the institutional setting in question (home, hospital) and with 
regard to the relationship between the persons involved (two acquaintances, 
parent and child). 
Relying on the philosophical understanding of authority as legitimized 
power, we may ask: how does such legitimation operate? As pointed out by 
Turner (2005: 18), “authority can degenerate into coercion, just as coercion 
can be transformed into authority, and it is important to study how these 
changes  occur.”  Thus,  in  order  to  answer  the  above-mentioned  question,  
sociologists have discussed the conditions for legitimization: the leader’s 
charisma, traditional norms, legal rationality (Weber 1964; Scott 1973), and 
the principles of absolute value (Spencer 1970). Besides, in the domain of 
social psychology, researchers have considered the psychological dynamics 
underlying the feelings of obligation to obey (Tyler & Lind 1992; Tyler 1997; 
2001; 2002), the different types of collective sources of legitimacy (Zelditch & 
Walker 1984; Walker & Zelditch 1993; Johnson & Ford 1996; Hegtvedt & 
Johnson  2000;  2009;  Zelditch  2001),  as  well  as  the  mechanisms  by  which  
people may maintain and enhance their own positions in a given social 
structure (Ridgeway & Johnson 1990; Clark 1990; 1997; Ridgeway & Walker 
1995; Kyl-Heku & Buss 1996). Conversation analysts, then again, have sought 
to describe the exact ways in which power becomes legitimized in different 
kinds of mundane and institutional environments (Fisher & Todd 1986), such 
as  various  medical  settings  (Heritage  &  Sefi  1992;  Heath  1992;  Boyd  1998;  
Peräkylä 1998; 2002; Ruusuvuori 2000; Stivers 2002; 2006; Heritage 2005; 
Pomerantz et al. 2007), classrooms (McHoul 1978; 1990; Mehan 1979; 
Macbeth  1991),  courts  (Atkinson  &  Drew  1979;  Komter  1995),  news  
broadcasts (Raymond 2000), and children’s play (M. H. Goodwin 1980; 
Griswold 2007). In general, conversation analysts have observed how 
authority is displayed in the ways in which participants’ turns are designed 
and linked to their co-participants’ turns of talk. Participants’ orientations to 
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authority can be perceived, for example, by the degree to which one 
participant can initiate, maintain and close up sequences of action, or 
maintain  their  version  of  the  ongoing  activity  (Heath  1992;  Ruusuvuori  
2000). 
 
 
1.3.2 Deontic authority 
The concept of authority is inherently ambiguous (Walton 1997: 76). A 
widespread view involves a distinction between authority “by fact” (de facto) 
and authority “by law” (de jure) (Peters 1967). A person may be an authority 
either “in practice” or “in theory” (or, of course, both). Put in another way, a 
person may be “an authority” or “in authority” (Friedman 1973). This view is 
loosely linked to the idea that a person may be an authority either in a certain 
field of knowledge and expertise or he or she may occupy a certain position 
associated  with  certain  rights  to  set  the  rules  concerning  what  should  be  
done. These two essentially different ways of being an authority have been 
dealt with in terms of “cognitive authority” vs. “administrative authority” 
(Walton 1997: 76-77), “epistemic authority” vs. “executive authority” (De 
George 1985), and “authority over belief” vs. “authority over conduct” (Lukes 
1978). In this study, I will rely on Bochenski’s (1974) distinction between 
“epistemic authority” and “deontic authority.” This is for three reasons. First, 
neither of these notions suggests that authority necessarily needs to go along 
with the official position of the authoritative person (cf. e.g., “administrative 
authority”), which is consistent with my conversation analytic endeavor to 
examine people’s orientations to authority as an empirical matter. Second, 
ever since the influential paper by Heritage & Raymond (2005), the concept 
of “epistemic authority” has been well established in the domain of empirical 
interaction research, which makes it natural to call attention to its deontic 
sibling.  Third,  these  terms  are  in  line  with  linguistic  terminology,  which  
involves a distinction between epistemic and deontic modalities—even if the 
relationships between these two modalities and the two above-mentioned 
forms of authority are far from straightforward (see Givón 2005: 149, 
171-177). 
It is the notion of “deontic authority”—someone’s legitimate power to 
determine actions—that forms the central focus of this study. In Bochenski’s 
description, the typical deontic situation looks relatively complex: “the 
authority of x is accepted by y in the field ? when y desires a certain event e, 
and the acceptance of the authority is necessary in order to realize e” 
(Bochenski 1974: 77). This means that if someone rejects deontic authority, 
they either do not desire the aim in question or believe that obedience to the 
authority is not a necessary condition for the desired aim, or both. In other 
 19 
 
words, as already stated above, it is the intentions of y, not those of x, which 
occupy the central place in the construction of deontic authority. As pointed 
out by Weber (1978: 212), the motives for obedience may vary from habits to 
rational self-interested calculations. Most importantly, however, the 
subordinates themselves regard their subordination as something that they 
do of their own free will; for whatever reason, they think that it is useful for 
them to  acknowledge  another  person  as  their  deontic  authority  in  a  certain  
domain of action.  
How do people’s orientations to someone’s deontic authority then show 
at the micro-level of their face-to-face interactional encounters? Inspired by 
Searle’s (1976) way of categorizing speech acts with regard to their “direction 
of  fit”  between  “the  words”  and  “the  world,”  I  have  suggested  that,  in  this  
respect, epistemic authority and deontic authority are associated with two 
opposite  types  of  speech  acts  (see  Stevanovic  2011).  Epistemic  authority  is  
about getting the “words  to  match  the  world;”  deontic  authority  is  about  
getting the “world  to  match  the  words.”  While  epistemic  authority  is  about  
knowing what is true, deontic authority is about determining what  “ought-
to-be”—what will be forbidden, obligatory, or permissible (the ancient Greek 
word deon, “that which is binding”). From this perspective, deontic authority 
can  be  associated  with  the  class  of  “directive-commissive”  speech  acts  
(Couper-Kuhlen, forthcoming), including requests, proposals, and 
suggestions (directives), on the one hand, and offers, invitations, and 
promises (commissives), on the other hand. At the same time, however, 
epistemic authority and deontic authority are also intertwined in many ways, 
even within single utterances (Antaki 2012; Antaki & Kent 2012: 884; Kent 
2012:  713).  This  is  particularly  clear  from the  point  of  view of  the  linguistic  
resources that are first associated with deontic authority (see Hakulinen & 
Sorjonen 2004; Givón 2005: 149, 171-177). Imperatives, for example, 
represent the most stereotypical way of issuing orders and commands (M. H. 
Goodwin 1990: 83; Craven & Potter 2010: 442) and thus constitute a central 
practice for claiming deontic authority. However, imperatives can also be 
used to perform actions that have little to do with deontic authority, like 
instructing  someone  towards  the  means  of  achieving  something,  or  making  
an offer or an invitation (Wootton 1997: 62; Huddleston & Pullum 2005: 8; 
Maynard & Heritage 2005: 429). Another stereotypical way of claiming 
deontic authority involves deontic modality (Palmer 2001; Givón 2005: 
149-177); archetypical deontic modal verbs, such as ought, must, should, can, 
may and could, can certainly be deployed to establish what is obligatory, 
permissible  or  forbidden  (see  Sterponi  2003;  Curl  &  Drew  2008;  Zinken  &  
Ogiermann 2011). Still, the mere existence of a deontic modal verb in an 
utterance is not enough to make the utterance count as an instance of deontic 
authority. For example, the friendly advice of a work colleague to see a doctor 
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is most likely to contain such a verb (you  must  see  a  doctor), but if the 
question here is about authority in the first place, that authority is rather of 
an epistemic than of a deontic nature. 
What can then be said about the participants’ orientations to deontic 
authority at the micro-level of interaction? To enhance our understanding of 
what kinds of cases could count as instances of deontic authority, we might 
start  by  noting  what  the  other  two  power  phenomena  discussed  above—
coercion  and  persuasion—might  look  like  in  people’s  interactional  conduct.  
When it comes to coercion, we may think of any dominant interactional 
behavior that is unresponsive to other people’s concerns as some form of 
coercion (on “dominance,” see Drews 1993; on “domineeringness,” see 
Rogers-Millar & Millar 1979). For example, someone may talk much more 
than his co-participants, always trying to determine the topics of 
conversation, or seeking to impose his own views on the things talked about 
(Linell et al. 1988; Linell & Luckmann 1991; cf. M. H. Goodwin 1992; 2002; 
Hutchby  1996;  1999b)—and,  of  course,  also  issue  orders  and  commands.  
Inasmuch as others cannot but try to cope with the situation, we may indeed 
talk about some form of coercion—something that needs to be kept separate 
from the notion of deontic authority. What about persuasion, then? It seems 
clear that, in spoken interaction, persuasion may operate, for example, 
through explanatory accounts (Heritage 1988; Houtkoop 1990), displays of 
emotion (Fitch & Foley 2007, Nikander 2007), or through discursive 
practices  by  which  people  may  try  to  position  themselves  as  being  right,  
competent, and knowledgeable (Davies & Harré 1990; Harré & van 
Langenhove 1999; Thornborrow 2002; Harré et al. 2009)—through anything 
by  which  the  participants  may  hope  to  be  able  to  influence  their  co-
participants’ beliefs, attitudes, or actions. 
But now, when it comes to authority, we may need to shift our focus 
from the potentially authoritative participants to their co-participants; as 
pointed  out  above,  authority  is  not  primarily  about  someone  claiming 
authority, but it is about others accepting someone as an authority. This 
means, by and large, that it is not the initiating actions of potentially 
authoritative participants that tell us about the participants’ orientations to 
deontic authority, but it is the ways in which their co-participants respond to 
those actions.  At  the local  level  of  interaction,  we may think about the issue 
from two different perspectives. First, while participants in interaction 
inevitably need to make choices with respect  to their  spoken and expressive 
contributions, someone’s authority in this specific domain of action becomes 
visible, for example, when people, in certain types of institutional 
interactions, comply with the asymmetrical turn-taking systems that endow 
them with quite different amounts of freedom in terms of their talk (Mehan 
1979;  Macbeth  1991;  Kendall  1993)  or,  for  other  reasons,  allow  one  
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participant of the encounter (e.g., the chairperson of an organizational 
meeting) to exert control over the agenda for the emerging interaction 
(Greatbatch  1986;  Drew  &  Heritage  1992;  Boden  1994;  Ruusuvuori  2000;  
McKinlay & McVittie 2006; Barnes 2007; Pomerantz & Denvir 2007; Angouri 
& Marra 2011). Second, while participants in interaction may sometimes 
discuss their more or less distant actions (often including actions other than 
those that are performed through talk), their orientations to someone having 
the  authority  to  decide  about  those  actions  can  be  seen,  for  example,  in  
people’s overt expressions of subordination (Griswold 2007), as well as in 
their displays of compliance and commitment to actions that have only been 
hinted at (Stevanovic 2011; on the well-known phenomenon of indirectness 
in  directive  speech  acts,  see  Clark  1979;  Brown  &  Levinson  1987  [1978];  
Blum-Kulka 1987; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Byon 2006; Silverstein 2010). All 
this  suggests  that  a  person’s  deontic  authority  is  not  so  much a  question  of  
what  this  person  does  but,  first  and  foremost,  a  question  of  how  his  
utterances and other interactional behaviors are treated by  his  co-
participants. This leads us to the issue of cooperation, which is to be 
discussed next. 
 
 
1.4 Cooperation 
Human action is intrinsically cooperative. In contrast to those views that 
posit that human action emerges out of egocentric calculations (on social 
exchange theory, see Homans 1958; Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Befu 1977; Cook & 
Emerson 1978; Settoon et al. 1996; Molm et al. 2000; Thye 2000; Lawler 
2001; Erdrogan & Liden 2002; Tse et al. 2008; see also Hobbes 1962 [1651]), 
Tomasello (2009) has argued, and presented evidence, that human children 
are  genuinely  cooperative  from early  on  (cf.  Parsons  1949  [1937];  Rousseau  
2006 [1754], see also Axelrod 1984: 3-4; Gronow 2008: 369). They have not 
learned this from adults; it comes naturally. And, of course, also our everyday 
experiences suggest that people can be cooperative quite spontaneously: 
many people pay their taxes honestly, participate in unions and protest 
movements  even  if  this  may  cost  them  money,  work  hard  in  teams  where  
their personal achievements might go unnoticed, and cooperate with 
strangers without any prospect of reciprocity or gain in reputation (Henrich 
et  al.  2001;  Fehr  et  al.  2002;  Fehr  &  Gächter  2002;  2004;  Johnson  et  al.  
2003;  Fehr  &  Schmidt  2004:  272).  But  then  again,  everybody  can  also  see  
that cooperation is not all that there is in the world. Tomasello has thus 
argued that, later in ontogeny, children’s rather unselective cooperativeness 
becomes mediated by such influences as their judgments of likely reciprocity 
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and concerns for reputation. At the same time, they grow into internalizing 
diverse cooperation-related societal and cultural norms. 
People may engage in complex collaborative activities, such as singing 
in a choir, preparing a meal together, collaborating scientifically, and so on. It 
is in the context of such collaborative activities that language use also 
prototypically occurs (Clark 1996; Tomasello et al. 2005: 675); a good 
example of a collaborative achievement is the initiation, maintenance and 
closing-up of  a  conversation (Schegloff  & Sacks 1973;  Button & Casey 1984; 
Auer 1990; Robinson 2001; Antaki 2002; LeBaron & Jones 2002; Goldberg 
2004; West 2006; Bolden 2008). Within the overall collaborative framework 
of social interaction, even single “individual” actions are often more 
collaborative than they might first appear (see e.g., C. Goodwin 1979). While 
a single action may be compounded out of different kinds of interactional 
resources, different actors may deploy dissimilar materials in order to 
contribute to a single shared action (e.g., the speaker produces a verbal 
utterance and, simultaneously, the hearer produces visual displays of affect, 
which both contribute to the ongoing action). Charles Goodwin’s notion of 
“cooperative  semiosis”  refers  to  the  arrangement  in  which  “action  emerges  
through a process in which signs are produced to be operated on by another” 
(C. Goodwin 2011: 189). While cooperative semiosis as a phenomenon is 
characteristic of all human interaction, the notion of cooperative semiosis is 
particularly useful when researchers seek to account for interactions where 
one or more of the participants are less-than-fully-competent speakers 
(Kotthoff 2010), such as children (Cekaite 2010), second language learners 
(Kasper 2006), and people with aphasia (C. Goodwin 2010; 2011).  
In  the  context  of  human  action,  cooperation  also  reaches  beyond  to  
what is immediately observable in people’s public conduct; it guides human 
inference processes. In his seminal work, Grice (1975) has pointed out how 
communicators  and  recipients  necessarily  need  to  work  together  to  get  the  
communicator’s message across; in a normal case, it is the participants’ joint 
goal to get the recipient to know the communicator’s social intention. Given 
the unavoidable difference between what is directly said in an utterance and 
what is the actual communicative intention behind the utterance (on the 
“documentary method of interpretation,” see Garfinkel 1984 [1967]), Grice 
(1975: 46) has suggested that, in a conversation, participants proceed 
according  to  an  implicit  assumption  that  he  termed  the  cooperative 
principle: “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange  in  which  you  are  engaged.”  According  to  Grice,  all  effective  
communication in social situations is based on this kind of cooperation. Even 
though the principle has been phrased as a prescriptive command, it is best 
understood as a description of how the participants normally behave in 
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conversation; they assume that whatever their co-participants say in a 
conversation, it is meant to be heard as a contribution to the ongoing 
conversation—as something that furthers the purpose of that conversation 
(Bach 2006). Grice divided the cooperative principle into four maxims (the 
maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner), which describe the 
specific rational assumptions by which people who obey the cooperative 
principle interpret each other’s utterances (Grice 1975: 45-46). 
Grice’s cooperative principle is important in that it explains how it is 
possible for human communicators to use very simple gestures to signal 
many different kinds of more or less complex intentions. For example, 
someone  may  point  to  a  pen  to  make  a  request  for  her  partner  to  give  it  to  
her,  to  inform  the  recipient  about  the  presence  of  the  pen,  or  to  share  her  
happiness  of  having  found the  pen.  Or,  the  communicator  might  point  to  a  
pen, apparently, just to inform the recipient about its presence, but with the 
ulterior motive of suggesting that the recipient uses it. Or, she could do this 
with the intention of proposing that the participants play “spin the bottle” 
with  it.  What  is  then  the  basis  on  which  the  recipients  may  infer  all  these  
different kinds of intentions? The mere cooperative principle cannot 
determine the specific contents of those interpretations that, in each case, 
would  best  further  the  purpose  of  the  conversation.  Instead,  the  specific  
contents of those interpretations are guided by the participants’ 
considerations of several “real world” features: all the normative expectation 
that the members of the same culture share, the participants’ common 
history,  everything  that  they  know  about  each  other,  as  well  as  the  current  
encounter—everything that has happened in this very interaction so far. 
Taken together, all these matters make up what can be called the participants’ 
“common ground” (Clark 1996; Enfield 2006; Tomasello 2008; 2009)—the 
set of knowledge, beliefs and suppositions (concerning both the material and 
social world) that the participants believe that they share, and which enables 
them to coordinate their joint actions and activities. It makes it possible for 
them to match up between what each of them means and what their co-
participants understand them to mean. 
In his writing on common ground, Clark (1996: 112-121) takes into 
special consideration the effect that social relationships have on language 
production and interpretation. Notably, he suggests that, for people, their 
social relationships are basically defined by the type and amount of common 
ground that two people have. From this point of view, someone’s deontic 
authority in a certain domain of action is nothing but a potential part of 
certain participants’ common ground, which helps them to determine how 
they should design their communicative actions so as to be recognizable as 
such by their co-participants and how they should interpret their co-
participants’ utterances and expressions as actions. In other words, people’s 
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common orientations to someone’s deontic authority are one of those things 
that help them to decide what to do in order to be cooperative.  
 
 
1.5 Deontic rights 
While  the  notion  of  deontic  authority  captures  the  idea  of  asymmetrical 
distribution  of  power  to  decide  about  actions,  we  may  introduce  the  more  
general notion of “deontic rights” to be able to describe the variety of ways in 
which  power  can  be  distributed  among participants.4 The notion of deontic 
rights refers to the latent potential that a participant has in a specific domain 
of action in relation to his co-participants. Just like the concept of deontic 
authority,  the  notion  of  deontic  rights  is  also  in  line  with  the  recent  
conversation analytic literature on “epistemics” (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 
2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Heritage 2012a; 2012b; 2012c), where the 
notion of “epistemic rights” refers to people’s “relative access to, or rights to 
assess, knowledge, events, behavior, and the like in specific, locally organized 
sequences of talk” (Raymond & Heritage 2006: 681). 
Now, people may design their utterances in ways that suggest a more or 
less symmetrical relative distribution of deontic rights between the 
participants. Indeed, some of the linguistic choices that are available for the 
participants in this regard have already been described in several 
conversation analytic studies (Ervin-Tripp 1976; M. H. Goodwin 1980; West 
1990;  Heinemann 2006;  Curl  &  Drew 2008;  Craven  &  Potter  2010).  Ervin-
Tripp (1976),  for  example,  has ordered different directive forms with regard 
to  the  relative  power  relationship  between  the  participants  that  they  imply.  
On the basis of her findings, we may assume that “need statements” (I need a 
match), for instance, suggest a relatively asymmetrical distribution of deontic 
rights between the participants, while “question directives” (Gotta match?), 
for example, are more symmetrical in this respect. Likewise, Heinemann 
(2006) has discussed positive and negative interrogatives as ways for senior-
citizens to display their entitlement to have different kinds of services from 
home help providers. With positive interrogatives the care recipients display 
an orientation to their requests as something that they are not fully entitled 
to make. In contrast, with negative interrogatives the care recipients display 
that they are really entitled to have the requested service. Along the same 
lines, Curl and Drew (2008) have shown that the request forms that speakers 
                                                        
4 Mann (1986: 7) was ready to dismiss the whole concept of authority,  because of the black 
and white way of thinking that it presupposes. And Lukes (2005: 65) pointed out that, even 
within  a  binary  relationship,  authority  may  characterize  only  some  of  the  interactions  
between the participants. 
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select reflect their understandings of the contingencies associated with the 
recipient’s ability to grant the request, and thereby also their entitlement to 
make  the  request:  by  prefacing  a  request  with  a  modal  verb  (e.g.,  Can 
you…?), speakers display high entitlement to make the request, while, by 
choosing some other request formats (e.g., I wonder if…?), they display low 
entitlement. 
In this study, I will invoke the notion of “deontic stance” to refer to the 
strength of deontic rights relative to the recipient in a certain domain—as it is 
claimed  by  the  choice  of  the  form  of  an  utterance  (Stevanovic  2011).  In  
general, the term “stance” signifies a positioning that is achieved through 
overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms) 
and thus made publicly accessible (Du Bois 2007: 169). Deontic stance thus 
denotes the positioning that a person occupies on a “deontic gradient” (on the 
analogous notion of “epistemic gradient,” see Heritage 2012a). As an 
example,  we  may  imagine  that  someone  wants  to  get  her  spouse  to  stop  
humming so that she can hear the radio weather report. In principle, she 
could say one of the following utterances: 
 
(a) Shut up! 
(b) Would you please be quiet? 
(c) I’m sorry. I can’t hear the radio weather report. 
 
Each of these utterances conveys a request for (non-)action, but they have 
very different forms. While the imperatively framed request (a) involves a 
rather blunt claim of deontic authority, the interrogative format (b) conveys a 
mitigated stance on deontic rights: the recipient’s “quietness” is presented as 
something that is contingent on the recipient’s choice to comply. Then again, 
by formulating the request as a declarative (c), the speaker claims a relatively 
weak  deontic  stance:  it  is  entirely  up  to  the  recipient  to  sort  out  the  
implications that the speaker’s utterance has on the recipient’s own future 
actions. Of course, we may assume that deontic stance is not only a question 
about word choices and syntactic structures; further research is needed to 
assess the extent to which speakers may upgrade their deontic stances, for 
example, through gaze, gestures, and different kinds of prosodic realizations 
of the verbal content of their utterances (see Stevanovic & Frick, submitted). 
Given that the recipients may fail to recognize the deontic significance of the 
first speakers’ utterances, there might even be practices by which the first 
speakers may clarify that aspect of their actions ex post facto and, in so doing, 
“pursue” (Pomerantz 1984b) or “mobilize” (Stivers & Rossano 2010a) a 
deontic response from the recipient  (see e.g., Raymond 2004). 
Deontic  rights  are  not  only  about  people  trying  to  get  others  to  do  
things, but also about people being able to determine their own doings. 
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Hence, one important interactional environment where people’s deontic 
orientations become relevant is the activity of planning. When people talk 
about future actions—what will be done—they  will  have  to  orient  to  the  
deontic rights that each of the participants might have in the respective 
domain of action. There is, therefore, also another way of putting together a 
deontic gradient—something that can be exemplified by the following 
utterances. 
 
(d) I’ll submit my dissertation now. 
(e) Do you think that I could submit my dissertation now? 
(f) When do you think that I could submit my dissertation? 
 
In (d), where the speaker’s utterance is a declarative statement, the decision 
about the action in question is presented as already established. Thus, when 
said by a graduate student to his supervisor, the utterance clearly embodies a 
strong deontic stance—in a domain that does not traditionally belong to the 
student’s  sole  jurisdiction.  In  (e),  in  contrast,  where  the  utterance  has  the  
form of a polar question, the realization of the speaker’s plan is presented as 
contingent on the recipient. Therefore, the utterance embodies a weaker 
deontic stance in the matter at hand. The speaker’s deontic stance is even 
weaker in (f), where the speaker produces a wh-question; it is the recipient 
who is invited first to articulate the appropriate plan for the first speaker. 
Now,  what  is  absolutely  crucial  here  is  that  the  declarative  statement  in  (d)  
does not involve any specific linguistic characteristics that, as such, could be 
associated with a strong deontic stance. Indeed, the declarative statement can 
be heard as embodying a strong deontic stance merely because of certain 
contextual considerations that have to do with the relationship between the 
speaker and the recipient. If the same utterance had been said by a student, 
for example, to his mother, the utterance might not have had any deontic 
implications at all. Thus, given the importance of contextual considerations 
for the deontic hearing of certain types of utterances, we may need to find a 
way to systematically deal with the possibility that people’s orientations to 
their own and each other’s deontic rights may sometimes go beyond to what 
is publicly observable in their overt conduct. 
Because people’s deontic orientations may thus not always be captured 
by the mere notion of deontic stance, we may invoke yet another notion—that 
of  “deontic  status”  (see  e.g.,  Tomasello  2009:  55,  59;  on  “epistemic  status,”  
see Heritage 2012a). While the term “status” is used to describe the position a 
person occupies in a social structure (Linton 1936), with the term deontic 
status I refer to the deontic rights that a certain person has in a certain 
domain, irrespective of whether they momentarily claim these rights or not. 
While deontic stance and deontic status are often congruent with each other, 
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this is not inevitable. Since deontic status increases the probability of others’ 
cooperation, highly authoritative speakers rarely need to command. Instead, 
speakers with low authority, who cannot rely on other people’s readiness to 
cooperate in the desired ways, may sometimes try to inflate their authority 
with  more  assertive  directives.  The  notion  of  deontic  status  allows  us  to  
account for these kinds of situations, or any other situations where there is a 
discrepancy between the linguistic design of an utterance and its deontic 
strength—for example, when an imperative is heard as an offer or a piece of 
advice.  Even  if  someone’s  deontic  status  can  be  altered  from  moment  to  
moment as a result of specific interactional contributions, it is still a “real 
world” feature—something that can be taken as “given” and thus be deployed 
as an interactional resource.  
From the perspective of those conversation analytic views, according to 
which nothing external to what is observable in the participants’ public 
conduct  should  be  given  an  explanatory  status  in  the  account  of  interaction  
(see e.g., Schegloff 1997), this way of thinking might appear somewhat 
radical.  I  will,  therefore,  return  to  this  issue  later  in  this  study  (see  Section  
4.2).  At  this  point,  I  merely  maintain  that,  despite  my  theorizing  about  the  
participants’ tacit orientations to their social relationships and about their 
inferences based thereupon, the kind of approach that I adopt here does not 
make one lose sight of the minor details of the participants’ publicly 
observable conduct. Rather, the question is about taking into account all the 
information that one can possibly get, in order to be able to capture, as far as 
possible, the participants’ own interpretations of what is happening in the 
interaction then and there (cf. Arminen 2000)—something that, in this case, 
involves their orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights. 
 
 
1.6 Research question 
In  this  study,  I  examine  people’s  orientations  to  their  own and  each  other’s  
deontic rights, trying to shed light on the interplay between authority and 
cooperation. My research question can be formulated in the following way: 
 
 
How do people establish and negotiate their own and each other’s deontic 
rights cooperatively in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction? 
 
 
Each of the articles of this study deals with one or more interactional 
practices or patterns that are relevant in this regard. 
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2 DATA AND METHOD 
2.1 Church workplace meetings as data 
The data of this study are drawn from a set of 15 video-recorded planning 
meetings where pastors and cantors discuss their joint work tasks. The data 
were collected in seven congregations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Finland in the dioceses of several bishoprics during spring 2008. Among the 
church workers there were fifteen pastors and ten cantors. In one meeting 
there were two pastors and one cantor present. In another meeting there 
were  one  pastor  and  two  cantors.  The  remaining  thirteen  meetings  were  
dyads.  The  length  of  the  meetings  varied  from  20  to  60  minutes.  The  total  
length of all the video-recordings is about 10 hours. In the following, I will 
describe this particular interactional setting in more detail and try to make it 
clear why I think it is an excellent site for studying people’s orientations to 
their own and each other’s deontic rights. 
Recently,  working  life  has  been  subject  to  profound  changes  and  
developments. Since the 1990s, many traditional boundaries and rigid ways 
of organizing work have been abandoned in favor of modern collaborative 
types of work organization. One such type of work organization has been 
teamwork, which requires seamless collaboration and interaction between 
different kinds of employees with distinct competencies (Koster et al. 2007: 
118; Vogl 2009). Even if boundaries of social entities, such as professions and 
occupations,  are  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  people’s  identity  
formation and sense of autonomy and endurance (Abbot 1995), the 
boundaries around highly specified job roles have now, nevertheless, become 
blurry  (Lindbeck  &  Snower  2000;  Powell  2001).  Of  course,  this  gives  
employees new opportunities for learning, which may even enhance their 
happiness  with  their  work  (Luoma 2009:  16).  Besides,  deeper  collaboration  
provides a site for the development of solidarity among workers; it forces the 
workers  to  interact  with  one  another  in  ways  that  go  beyond  superficial  
mixing  (Koster  et  al.  2007:  118;  Vogl  2009)—something  that  has  been  
proposed to provide the basis for expanding democratic participation within 
the whole society (Grady 1990: 146-147). But besides these positive effects, all 
these changes may also generate stress for today’s employees (Morgan & 
Bowers 1995). One reason for this is that employees today are constantly 
confronted with having to negotiate their knowing, their doing, and their 
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worker identities in interactional encounters with other people (Iedema & 
Scheeres 2003).5 
The above-described developments are also reflected in the church 
workplace, where pastors and cantors have started to collaborate more than 
before. Selecting hymns for church events is a case in point. While, 
previously, it has been quite common for pastors to decide about the hymns 
unilaterally, recently, it has become more and more common that such 
decisions are made by the pastors and cantors together. Of course, the point 
of such collaboration is to be able to come to “better” decisions,6—that is, 
hymn choices that are sensitive both to the theological concerns of the pastor 
(e.g., that the hymns fit the sermon or the bible readings of the day) and to 
the musical concerns of the cantor (e.g., what other musical material, such as 
preludes and postludes, are available for the hymns; how to make the 
transitions between the hymns and the sung parts of liturgy). At the same 
time, the pastors and cantors are quite careful not to  intrude  into  the  
domains of each other’s expertise. I suggest that this is because the 
justification of the whole collaboration between pastors and cantors is 
essentially based on the participants’ distinct “territories of knowledge” 
(Heritage & Raymond 2005; Heritage 2012a; 2012b). To demonstrate this, let 
us consider Extracts 1 and 2. 
In Extract 1, a pastor (P) and a cantor (C) are discussing an upcoming 
Mass and trying to find a suitable “hymn of the day”—a hymn that is centered 
on the theme of the lectionary texts of a given Sunday. At the beginning of the 
fragment, the cantor makes a proposal by pointing out that a certain hymn 
(“four-five-three,” l. 1) has the needed content. With the word tietenkin 
“certainly” (l. 2) the cantor presents the matter at hand as self-evident. 
However,  through  her  immediate  “self-repair”  (Schegloff  et  al.  1977),  where  
she replaces the word tietenkin “certainly” (l. 2) with the word varmaan 
“probably” (l. 3), the cantor displays her orientation to herself as having no 
epistemic authority in the domain in question—a domain that has to do with 
the theological content of the hymn in relation to the bible texts of the mass. 
 
 
                                                        
5 It is, however, worth noting that the new models of work organization also enable remote 
work away from one’s actual work place, which again decreases the need for face-to-face 
collaboration within work communities. 
6 Still, the actual efficiency of joint decision making not self-evident (for social psychological 
literature on joint decision making, see Dewey 1910; Bales & Strodtbeck 1951; Bales & Slater 
1957; Eskola 1961; Fisher 1970; Hall 1971; Janis 1989; Poole & Roth 1989; Stasser & Stewart 
1992; Brodbeck et al. 2007; for conversation analytic literature on the same topic, see Francis 
1995; Heritage et al. 2001; Huisman 2001; Alby & Zucchermaglio 2006; 2008; Clifton 2009). 
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(1)(M5SH 6:51) 
01 C: neljäviiskolme  nyt on 
      four.five.three now be 
      now the four-five-three is 
 
02    tietenkin siis (.) mitä nyt on ninku  
      certainly PRT      what now is PRT 
      certainly (.) what there is like 
 
03    (.) varmaan  kuitenki aiheesta? 
          probably however  theme-ELA 
      (.) probably however about the theme? 
 
04 P: joo-o? 
      uh huh? 
 
 
In Extract 2, the participants talk about the opening hymn of the mass 
and about the kind of music that should pave the way for it. At the beginning 
of the fragment the cantor (C) announces her intentions in this respect (l. 1).  
 
 
(2)(HTM 10:??) 
01 C: tekisin  semmosen, (0.6) #kunnon#, (0.7) alkusoiton,= 
      I would make such a, (0.6) #proper#, (0.7) prelude,= 
 
02 P: =eiks  tost     saa aika  mahtavan? 
       NEG-Q that-ELA get quite majestic 
      =cannot that come to be quite majestic? 
 
03 C: j[oo. 
      y[ea. 
 
04 P:  [alkusoiton  ku (-) se  on jotenki,  (0.2) [muis]taakseni 
        prelude-GEN PRT    SG3 be somehow         recall-INF-POSS-1 
       [a prelude ‘cause (-) it is somehow, (0.2) [as I ] recall 
 
05 C:                                             [nii,] 
                                                  [yea,] 
 
06 P:    semmonen aika  massiivinen [  vi]rsi, 
         such a   quite massive     [  hy]mn, 
 
07 C:                               [joo.] 
                                    [yea.] 
 
 
The cantor’s announcement (“I would do such a, (0.6) #proper#, (0.7) 
prelude,” l. 1) is followed by the pastor’s mentioning of the possibility that the 
cantor’s prelude could indeed be “quite majestic” (l. 2). By formulating her 
utterance as a question, the pastor displays an orientation to the cantor’s 
superior epistemic rights in the matter.  In response to the cantor’s  minimal 
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uptake (“yea.” l. 3), the pastor goes on to account for her prior turn and does 
this by characterizing the hymn upon which the cantor is supposed to 
improvise  as  “massive”  (l.  6).  By  starting  her  characterization  of  the  hymn  
with the words ku se on “cause it is” (l. 4), the pastor claims immediate access 
to knowledge about the hymn and her rights to display this knowledge. 
However,  what  comes  next  is  repair:  by  adding  to  her  utterance  the  word  
muistaakseni (“as I recall,” l. 6), the pastor downgrades her epistemic rights 
in the domain in question—domain that deals with the musical content of the 
hymn. 
Extracts 1 and 2 elucidate how pastors and cantors display sensitivity to 
their  locally  relevant  identities  as  theologians  and  musicians,  and  refrain  
from intruding into the domains of each other’s expert knowledge. While 
such asymmetries with regard to epistemic authority can be an essential part 
of the justification for the collaboration between pastors and cantors, this is 
not the case with respect to deontic authority—something to be demonstrated 
by the following instances. 
In Extract 3, a pastor (P) and a cantor (C) are about to start their 
meeting, during which they are going to plan an upcoming church event. At 
the beginning of the fragment, the pastor tells the cantor about her prior 
preparations with respect to the event (l. 1-6). There are several features in 
the design of the pastor’s turn which suggest that this kind of talk is somehow 
problematic. First, the turn involves many pauses, hesitations and restarts, 
which clearly indicate that something problematic is about to be said. Second, 
the idea of the pastor having made a proposal for the church event in 
question is presented as a “sin” (“I sinned and made also (0.9) some kind of a 
proposal then.” l. 5-6), which makes visible the pastor’s orientation to the 
ideal unfolding of the planning meeting as an occasion where the preparation 
activity is starting from scratch. Third and finally, the pastor begins her turn 
by  referring  to  an  email  that  she  has  got  from  the  cantor  (“I  have  been  
reading, (1.1) your mail,” l. 1), thus implicating that the private activities that 
she is about to start describing have, after all, a collaborative basis: these 
activities relate to the content of the cantor’s email. 
 
 
(3)(VVYLT 0:07) 
01 P: mä  oon  sitä    sun,    (1.0) postia lukenuj ja 
      SG1 be-1 SG3-PAR SG2-GEN       mail-PAR 
      I have been reading, (1.1) your mail and 
 
02    jotenkij jo,      (0.2) ähhh (.) jo 
      somehow  already, (0.2) ehhh (.) already 
 
03    näitä     virsiä     (.) sit tietysti (.)kattonu  myös? 
      these-PAR hymn-PL-PAR    PRT of.course   look-PPC too 
      looked at (.) of course (.) these hymns too? 
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04    ja,  (.) .hhh ja  tuota:, (0.6) ja 
      and, (.) .hhh and erm:,   (0.6) and 
 
05    jonkillaise      ehdotuksenki     sitten, 
      some.kind.of-GEN proposal-GEN-CLI PRT 
      I sinned and made also 
 
06    (0.9) lankesin  tekemään. 
            sin-PST-1 do-INF-ILL 
      (0.9) some kind of a proposal then. 
 
07 C: .thhh (0.3) hyvä. hh  
      .tchh (0.3) good. hh 
 
 
Extract 3 demonstrates how pastors and cantors, in their joint planning 
meetings seem to orient to the expectation that their joint face-to-face 
encounters are primarily to be used for making decisions; the participants 
are not expected to discuss decisions that one of them has made unilaterally 
before the meeting. 
Extract  4  is  from  a  three-person  conversation  with  two  pastors  (P1  &  
P2) and a cantor (C). The fragment is drawn from the middle of a meeting 
where the participants have been planning a mass and it starts by one of the 
pastors  (P2)  initiating  talk  about  the  acclamation  “This  is  the  holy  gospel,”  
which  may,  but  need  not,  follow  the  gospel  reading  (l.  1-2).  Since  it  is  the  
other pastor present in the meeting (P1) who is supposed to read the gospel, 
the utterance can be heard as a suggestion that the participants decide about 
the matter now; after all, whatever the decision will be, it has an influence on 
the cantor’s duties in the mass (l. 15-40; 75-76; not shown in the transcript). 
The other pastor (P1), however, does not seem to be willing to consider the 
matter as something that the participants can decide upon jointly, then and 
there, but, instead, declares that she will decide about the matter afterwards, 
on her own (l. 61-62). 
 
 
(4)(HM2 27:35) 
01 P2: .hh ja  sitte voi olla     tota se 
       .hh and then  there can be erm  that 
 
02     tämä o      pyhä evankeliumi tai sitten ei. 
       this is the holy gospel      or  then   not. 
 
03 P1: nii >justiinsa<. 
       yea >exactly<. 
 
((55 lines removed, during which the participants discuss the 
situations where the acclamation “This is the holy gospel” is needed 
and when it can be left out.)) 
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59 C:  että    se [on s]itte vähän  turhaa      toisto[a  sitten.] 
       so that it [is t]hen  rather unnecessary repeti[tion then.] 
 
60 P2:            [joo.] 
                  [yea.] 
 
61 P1:                                                [ mä  ?päät]än 
                                                      [I’ll ?deci]de 
 
62     mä ?päätän   sen     si°tten sillon°, 
       I   decide-1 SG3-GEN PRT     then 
       I’ll ?decide it th°ere then°, 
 
63 C:  sä  voit [näit      viel]ä ?pohdiskella. 
       SG2 can-2 these-PAR still   contemplate-INF 
       you might still ?contemplate on these. 
 
64 P2:          [semmonen,     ] 
                [that sort of, ] 
 
65 P2: se, 
       it, 
 
66 C:  €työstäät  tota j[uttu[a€. ] 
       €work upon that i[ssue[€.  ] 
 
67 P2:                  [ehh [heh ] 
 
68 P1:                       [mä  ] (.) 
                             [I’ll] (.) 
 
69     €työst[än sitä nyt  ] tässä€, 
       €work [upon it right] here€, 
 
70 P2:       [hehh   hehh  ] 
 
 
Even if the pastor’s (P1) domineering conduct might appear problematic 
from the point of view of the participants’ collaboration, her co-participants 
(P2 & C) nevertheless manage the potentially awkward situation quite 
effectively—with the help of humor. In fact, they make fun of their co-worker. 
The cantor suggests, in a mocking way, that the pastor might still want to 
“contemplate” (l. 63) or “work upon” (l. 66) the issue of acclamation 
(something that is actually a simple yes-no decision, which, moreover, hardly 
has any significance for anyone—except for the cantor). The other pastor (P2) 
laughs (l. 67, 70). In response to her co-participants’ reactions, the pastor 
puts a slightly embarrassed smile on her face, and asserts that she will work 
upon the issue “right here” (l. 68-69). 
Extracts 3 and 4 demonstrate how the planning meetings between 
pastors and cantors are permeated by expectations of deontic symmetry: 
those details of the upcoming church events that the participants discuss in 
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their  meetings  are  ones  upon  which  the  participants  are  to  make  decisions  
together. As mentioned before, this is particularly interesting from the point 
of  view  of  the  recent  developments  in  church  work  communities.  The  
traditional  authority  of  the  clergy  in  the  Christian  church  and  society  is  
mirrored in the fact that sometimes the word “priest” is used as a metaphor 
for authority in general (see Peräkylä 1998: 317). While during the church 
history the position of the cantor has varied from the personal servant of the 
pastor to the highly respected music director (Edler 1983), nowadays, in the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland, the relationship between pastors 
and cantors is rather ambiguous. Cantors are musicians, not theologians, but 
they have an academic training comparable to that of pastors. Besides, 
cantors are inaugurated into their offices by the Chapter of the Church—just 
like  pastors.  At  the  local  level,  the  vicar  is  superior  to  the  cantor,  but  the  
hierarchy  between  cantors  and  ordinary  parish  pastors  is  more  or  less  a  
matter of negotiation. Certainly, there are pastors who see themselves as 
superior to the cantors and regard the joint planning meetings between them 
as unnecessary. But, at the same time, more and more church workers try to 
avoid such hierarchical thinking in favor of more egalitarian views. While the 
public work tasks of pastors and cantors are clearly defined in the Church 
Order, it is especially the pastors’ and cantors’ deontic rights with regard to 
the preparation of church events which are relatively blurry; the cantors are 
responsible for the music in church events, but the pastors are responsible for 
the church events as a whole, which also includes music. Therefore, the idea 
about pastors’ and cantors’ joint planning meetings is associated with an 
open question: what kinds of issues—if any—are supposed to be taken into 
the sphere of joint decision making and deontic symmetry and what issues 
should definitely not be taken into that sphere? Even if the discrepancies in 
this regard might be inconvenient for the participants themselves, the happy 
news for a conversation analytic researcher is that the pastors’ and cantors’ 
sometimes conflicting orientations towards their own and each other’s 
deontic rights in different domains of action make these orientations per se 
visible in their interaction. 
 
 
2.2 Conversation analysis as a method 
In this study, I examine the pastors’ and cantors’ joint planning meetings 
within the methodological framework of conversation analysis (Heritage 
1984; Boden & Zimmerman 1991; Psathas 1995; Hutchby & Wooffit 1998; ten 
Have 2007; Schegloff 2007; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell & Stivers 2012). The initial 
formation of conversation analytic ideas is documented in the sociology 
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lectures given by Harvey Sacks in the University of California between 1964 
and 1972 (published as Sacks 1992a & 1992b). Sacks’s main idea was to study 
the social world by using recordings of naturally occurring conversations as 
data. This new technological innovation allowed him to “sit back and observe 
the structural quality of the world as it happens” (Boden 1994: 65). 
Conversation analysis was thus a radically empirical enterprise which 
presented itself as an alternative to the experimentally driven social 
psychology and to sociological theorizing on human action. The first 
conversation analytic findings were published in several groundbreaking 
papers, which aimed at explicating the systematic organization of generic 
conversational practices that inform the production and recognition of 
intelligible courses of action: these practices concerned turn taking (Sacks et 
al. 1974), repair (Schegloff et al. 1977), conversational openings (Schegloff 
1968; 1979) and closings (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). The early conversation 
analytic studies highlighted the amazing extent to which conversations are 
organized:  there  is  order  at  every  point—even  in  the  finest  details  of  the  
interactional conduct (Sacks 1984). Later on, conversation analytic research 
has  indeed  been  able  to  show  that  many  features  of  talk,  which  have  been  
regarded as anomalies of speech production (e.g., agrammatism, 
stammering, fumbling) and, therefore, as being of no interest from the 
viewpoint of social interaction per se, can actually be used as powerful 
interactional devices (see Schegloff 2003; Heeschen & Schegloff 2003). 
In conversation analysis, turns at talk are not primarily regarded as 
being about expressing thoughts and ideas but as being about implementing 
social actions, asking, asserting, inviting, proposing, requesting, 
commanding, agreeing, disapproving, arguing, warning, accusing, criticizing, 
offering help, apologizing, and so on (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1976). The basic 
idea of conversation analysis is very simple: it is used to study the ways in 
which these different kinds of social actions are organized into sequences. As 
pointed out by Arminen (2005: 2), conversation analysis is about asking 
“what an utterance does in relation to the preceding one(s) and what 
implications  an  utterance  poses  for  the  next  one(s).”  It  is  assumed that,  on  
the  one  hand,  turns  at  talk  make  relevant  certain  kinds  of  next  turns  and  
these next turns get their “meaning” in relation to the prior turns, while, on 
the other hand, these next turns ultimately define what the prior turns were 
doing—a question is a question precisely because it gets an answer (Schegloff 
& Sacks 1973; Sacks et al. 1974: 729; Heritage 1984: 245-253; Schegloff 2007: 
20-21; Enfield 2011: 285-287). This idea is particularly clear in so-called 
adjacency pairs (e.g., question/answer, greeting/greeting), where the 
dynamic relation between two different turns at talk is highly 
conventionalized (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Arguably, adjacency pair 
organization is strongly normative in character, which is shown not only in 
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the  multitude  of  cases  where  the  first  action  is  followed  by  the  appropriate  
next action, but, in particular, in those instances in which this is not the case. 
In such instances—for example, when a greeting is not returned—the 
appropriate next action is “noticeably absent” (Schegloff 1968; 1996) and the 
absence can become the object of “remedial efforts and justifiable negative 
inferences” (Goodwin & Heritage 1990: 287). 
Since conversation analysts use video or audio recordings of naturally 
occurring social interactions as their data, they are given direct access to the 
details of interaction, which they can scrutinize over and over again. The 
specific research questions are expected to arise inductively from the detailed 
scrutiny of data; they are not determined beforehand. Still, this scrutiny is 
normally guided by the concepts and overall theoretical ideas that arise from 
the previous conversation analytic literature. The research process usually 
starts with the transcription of the data. Audio data are usually transcribed 
according to the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson (Schegloff 2007: 
265-269); these include conventions for transcribing a wide variety of vocal 
and interactional phenomena, such as turn-final intonations, overlapping 
speech,  latching  of  sounds,  sound  stretches,  pace,  volume,  silences,  audible  
in-breaths and out-breaths, etc. Conversation analysts have also developed 
many different kinds of methods to add information about visual phenomena 
into  their  transcripts  (see  e.g.,  C.  Goodwin  1981;  Heath  1986;  Heath  &  Luff  
1996; Nevile 2006)—even if these conventions are less standardized. Notably, 
however, it is not the transcripts that constitute the conversation analytic 
data,  it  is  the  original  recordings  (Heritage  &  Atkinson  1984:  12).  
Transcription, nevertheless, works as a major “noticing device” (Jefferson 
1985); a researcher is forced to attend to many details of interaction which 
would otherwise escape their attention. After the transcription, the data 
analysis proceeds case by case, sequence by sequence. Ideally, the analysis 
starts with “unmotivated looking” of some pieces of data until the researcher 
notices something “interesting” happening at some moment. From that 
moment on, the aim of the researcher is to elaborate on and provide evidence 
for that rather intuitive understanding (ten Have 2007: 124). The next phases 
of  the  research  process  involve  collecting  instances  of  the  phenomena  of  
interest, determining their variation, explicating their structural features in 
relation to the previous conversation analytic research literature, and 
discussing the wider implications of the investigated phenomenon. The 
inclusion of the data transcripts in publications is important since it allows 
readers to check the validity of the analytic claims made in the study 
(Heritage  1995:  395;  Peräkylä  1997).  Thus,  depending on the specific 
phenomenon of interest, some researchers complement their transcripts with 
pitch and intensity contours produced with the signal analysis software 
package  PRAAT  to  provide  evidence  for  a  detailed  auditory  and  acoustic  
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analysis, or with still pictures, either in the form of drawings or in the form of 
digitized frame pictures, to enable thorough examination of the visual aspects 
of the data. 
With  Sacks’s  early  work  on  helpline  calls  and  group  therapy  as  an  
important exception (see Sacks 1992a: 3-20, 268-280), the first conversation 
analytic studies focused mainly on informal, everyday conversations. 
Relatively soon, however, conversation analysts increasingly started to apply 
their method to the studying of interaction in various institutional settings, 
such  as  in  court  (Atkinson  &  Drew  1979;  Maynard  1984),  medical  
consultations (Fisher & Todd 1983; Heath 1986; Silverman 1987), classrooms 
(McHoul 1978; 1990; Mehan 1979; Macbeth 1991), or news interviews 
(Heritage 1985; Clayman 1988; Greatbatch 1988; 1992; Heritage & 
Greatbatch 1991; Ekström 2001; 2009; Clayman & Heritage 2002; Clayman 
et al. 2007). In institutional contexts, conversation analysis has been 
understood as being about the ways in which talk is specialized and reduced 
to accomplish the institutional tasks at hand and, thereby, about describing 
how social institutions are “talked into being” (Heritage 1984: 290) by the 
participants engaged in institutional interaction (Drew & Heritage 1992; 
Arminen 2005). This idea draws from the ethnomethodological notions on 
the constitution of social realities in interaction (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; 
Heritage 1984; 1987). Essentially, the institutional context has been regarded 
as something that both poses constraints on participants’ social actions and is 
renewed by these actions (Heritage 1984: 280-290). Participants’ 
orientations to institutional realities have been shown to be located, for 
example, in their lexical choices and ways of taking and designing their turns, 
or in their displays of epistemic asymmetries (Drew & Heritage 1992: 29-53). 
While the number of conversation analytic studies of institutional interaction 
experienced a rapid growth in the 1990’s, from the point of view of this study, 
it is the studies on meetings, negotiations and multiprofessional teamwork 
that are most central (e.g. Boden 1994, 1995; Bilmes 1995; Button & Sharrock 
1995;  Walker  1995;  Meier  1997;  Kangasharju  1998;  Housley  1999;  2000;  
2003; Huisman 2001; Arminen & Perälä 2002; Buttny & Kellog Rath 2007; 
Barske  2009;  Clifton  2009;  Nielsen  2009;  for  overviews,  see  Firth  1995;  
Asmuss & Svennevig 2009; Nikko 2009; Asmuss 2011; Asmuss & Oshima 
2012). For one, this is because meetings and negotiations are often essentially 
about decision-making (see e.g., Francis 1995; Heritage et al. 2001; Huisman 
2001; Clifton 2009), which again is directly linked to the question about the 
participants’ deontic rights with respect to specific future actions. 
Importantly, conversation analytic studies on meeting talk have shown how 
decisions are far from being straightforwardly identifiable phenomena. 
Instead,  as  pointed  out  by  Huisman  (2001:  70),  “decision-making  is  an  
incremental  activity  in  which  members  of  an  organization  move  their  
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agendas forward, step by step.” Another reason for the relevance of the 
above-mentioned studies for the present considerations lies in the fact that 
also  many  other  central  topics  in  these  studies—turn-taking  and  turn-
allocation, participants’ orientations to agenda, the role of the chair (see e.g., 
Boden 1994; 1995; Holmes et al. 2007; Pomerantz & Denvir 2007)—have a 
lot to do with the participants’ deontic rights-that is, their rights concerning 
their local interactional choices. 
Although conversation analysis has its roots in sociology, it has also 
been widely applied and developed in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, 
and  other  disciplines.  Besides  the  verbal  content  of  talk  and  the  sequential  
placement of utterances, many conversation analysts have also started to pay 
increasing attention to the prosodic delivery of utterances—that is, their 
rhythm,  tempo,  intensity,  pitch  register,  pitch  movement  and  voice  quality  
(Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996; Couper-Kuhlen & Ford 2004; Szczepek Reed 
2009; 2010; Barth-Weingarten et al. 2010). At the same time, other 
conversation analytic researchers have been interested in the visual aspects of 
the participants’ conduct—that is, their gaze, facial expressions, gestures, and 
body postures, as well as their deployment of material artifacts and other 
features  of  the  environment  as  interactional  resources  (C.  Goodwin  1981;  
2003; Heath 1986; Heath & Luff 1996; 2010; 2011; 2012; Nevile 2006; 
Haddington 2006; 2010; 2012; Peräkylä & Ruusuvuori 2006; 2012; Mondada 
2007; 2009; Ruusuvuori & Peräkylä 2009; Markaki & Mondada 2012; see 
also Enfield 2009). Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is an important 
line of conversation analytic research revolving around the notion of 
epistemics, which focuses on participants’ orientations to what each of them 
knows  and  on  the  ways  in  which  they  adjust  their  actions  in  this  regard  
(Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Kim 2011; 
Heritage  2012a;  2012b;  2012c;  for  early  work  on  the  topic,  see  also  Drew  
1991).  Moreover,  there  has  been  work  on  what  can  be  called  the  “action  
formation” problem—that is, what are the practices of talk and other conduct 
which  have  as  an  outcome  the  production  of  particular,  recognizable  social  
actions, such as requesting, inviting, and complaining (Schegloff 2006: 
87-89;  2007:  7)?  In  other  words,  while  the  conversation  analysts  have  long  
observed how participants design their turns at talk so as to be recognizable 
as specific social actions, they have recently started to consider why it is that 
a certain utterance is heard as conveying a certain action and not something 
else  (Levinson  2012).  As  a  result,  we  can  evidence  a  growing  amount  of  
literature about so-called “social action formats” (Fox 2007)—that is, 
regularly patterned clusters of resources that are deployed to convey specific 
actions,  such  as  requests  for  information  (Jones  &  Beach  2005;  Clayman & 
Heritage 2009; Heritage 2012a), requests for action (Wootton 2005; 
Lindström 2005; Heinemann 2006; Asmuss 2007; Curl & Drew 2008; 
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Antaki & Kent 2012; Rossi 2012), offers (Curl 2006; Kärkkäinen & Keisanen 
2012),  proposals  (Tykkyläinen  &  Laakso  2009;  Asmuss  &  Oshima  2012),  
suggestions (Li 2009), announcements (Holt 1993; M. H. Goodwin 1996; 
Emmison & Danby 2007) and complaints (Drew & Holt 1988; Drew 1998; 
Drew & Walker 2009; Heinemann & Traverso 2009; Ogden 2010). 
As I see it, the current developments in the domain of conversation 
analysis exhibit a tendency to account for the organization of interaction in a 
way that goes beyond the distinction between mundane conversations and 
institutional  interactions.  For  example,  some of  the  studies  on  social  action  
formats draw on both mundane conversations and institutional interactions 
as data, in order to be able to make more general claims about the 
relationship  between  action  and  turn  design  (see  e.g.,  Curl  &  Drew  2008).  
The same also holds for research on epistemics; while both societal 
institutions, such as schools and hospitals, and mundane institutions, such as 
parenthood and friendship, pertain to the relative distribution of epistemic 
rights between participants, the central interest in this line of research is to 
account for the practices by which these rights can be negotiated in the turn-
by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction—independently, as it were, of 
what  the  exact  source  of  these  rights  in  each  case  is.  This  is  essentially  the  
kind of approach that I adopt in this study, too. Even if my data are drawn 
from a certain type of institutional interaction, my primary aim is not to 
describe  this  particular  institutional  reality  as  such  but  to  shed  light  on  the  
ways in which participants may negotiate their deontic rights-for example, 
claim deontic authority, challenge their co-participants’ deontic authority 
claims, or establish a symmetrical distribution of deontic rights between the 
participants. This, I hope, is something that can be relevant for the study of 
analogous interactional phenomena across different contexts, where the 
participants’ deontic rights may be oriented to as more or less symmetrical or 
asymmetrical, negotiable or pre-established. 
 
 
2.3 Research process 
Previously, I provided an account of conversation analytic research processes 
in general. I will now describe the research process of this particular study. 
My decision to study the interaction between pastors and cantors was a 
spontaneous idea that emerged on one day in January 2008. I was on 
maternity  leave  from  my  job  as  a  cantor  in  the  parish  of  Loimaa  and  I  
received  a  visit  from  our  daughter’s  godmother,  who  worked  as  a  pastor  in  
the same parish. We realized that there were a couple of church events that 
we needed to discuss together (despite my maternity leave, I occasionally 
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played at church services), and I came up with the idea of recording our 
discussion. At that point, I did not know much about conversation analysis. 
But I knew that my cousin’s cousin’s cousin, Esa Lehtinen, had applied this 
methodology  in  his  dissertation,  and  I  had  thus  been  wondering  whether  I  
could write such a dissertation, too. I wanted to test whether the planning 
interactions between pastors and cantors would provide interesting data for 
such  a  purpose.  That  first  video-recording  turned  out  to  be  interesting  
indeed. I was shocked to see the way in which I had continuously ignored my 
co-participants’  proposals  and  tried  to  impose  my  own  views  on  her.  I  also  
came to think about Matti Taatila, the rector of the Loimaa parish, who had 
emphasized the inescapable “structural tenseness” of the relationship 
between pastors and cantors—irrespective of the persons involved in that 
relationship. Intuitively, I believed that my boss was right but—inspired by 
my video-recording—I became interested in learning more about the 
structural properties that might actually cause this tension. 
So, I wanted to collect more data. I selected the parishes where I 
thought that I could relatively easily do that—a decision that was based on my 
personal acquaintances with certain cantors and/or on practical issues 
concerning  my travelling  to  different  parishes.  I  made  my first  contact  with  
each  parish  by  phoning  the  cantor  (or  one  of  the  cantors)  of  the  parish;  I  
thought  that  it  would  be  my  fellow  cantors  who  would  most  likely  be  
motivated  to  organize  the  needed  appointments  for  data  collection.  Also,  
because in parishes there are regularly more cantors than pastors, it is 
usually cantors who know best whether there are collaborative planning 
activities  in  their  work  communities.  With  most  of  the  cantors  that  I  spoke  
with,  we  could  indeed  set  up  a  date  for  data  collection.  When  this  was  not  
possible,  it  was  usually  for  practical  reasons:  either  we  could  not  find  a  
suitable date for my visit to the parish or there were no pastors in the parish 
who planned church events together with the cantor—something that cantors 
usually deeply bemoaned. A couple of times I needed to contact the pastors as 
well, to ask their willingness to participate in the study. Typically, however, it 
was the cantors themselves who recruited their co-workers for the study. My 
intuition  is  that,  in  most  cases,  the  participants  would  have  had  their  joint  
planning meetings anyway, independent of my request to video-record their 
meetings.  Still,  there  were  several  cases  in  which  I  had  the  feeling  that  the  
cantors made use of the situation and deployed my study as an excuse to 
suggest joint planning meetings to pastors with whom they would not usually 
collaborate in this way.7 
At the end of June 2008, I had video-recorded fifteen planning 
meetings between pastors and cantors in seven different parishes in the 
                                                        
7 How this might pertain to the participants’ interactional conduct will be discussed later in 
this study (see Section 4.4). 
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dioceses of several bishoprics. Besides this, my research plan had been 
accepted by the scientific board of the Sibelius Academy, which meant that I 
could  officially  start  working  on  my  dissertation.  So,  during  the  next  six  
months after the data collection, I transcribed my data with Transana. I was 
still on maternity leave but, practically every time my baby daughter had a 
nap, I started transcribing. During my transcribing I often got a strong feeling 
that something interesting is going on beneath the surface of the interaction 
and I urgently wanted to learn how to tackle these phenomena. After having 
my  data  transcribed,  I  thus  started  to  analyze  my  data,  but  I  found  it  very  
hard.  I  even  tried  to  make  collections  of  different  kinds  of  interactional  
phenomena,  but none of  these collections turned out to be useful.  As I  have 
understood later, it is indeed difficult to do conversation analysis alone; you 
need the support of a conversation analytic community in order to be able to 
develop your analytic skills at a satisfactory level. Indeed, it was when I later 
started hanging around with other conversation analytic researchers that 
things became easier. One of the turning points of my whole research process 
was when I heard about Raymond and Heritage’s article “The Epistemics of 
Social Relations: Owning Grandchildren” (2006). At that time, I did not have 
access to the electronic databases of the University of Helsinki, but I 
purchased the article  with the conviction that  it  would somehow change the 
direction of my research. And it indeed did. I started to examine my data 
through the lenses of epistemics. However, when I tried to apply the notion of 
epistemics  to  the  situations  in  which  I  had  the  feeling  that  the  participants  
were engaged in implicit authority struggles, it became clear to me that these 
struggles  were  not  primarily  about  epistemics.  As  a  result,  I  started  to  play  
with the idea of  deontics,  with which I  felt  that  I  could make sense of  these 
other types of authority struggles. Later on, I also came across with 
Bochenski’s (1974) distinction between epistemic authority and deontic 
authority, which encouraged me to keep on looking at my data in this way. 
In February 2010, after yet another maternity leave that I had after the 
birth of our second child, I started doing my dissertation full time—now, in 
the  Department  of  Social  Research  in  the  University  of  Helsinki  and  under  
the supervision of Professor Anssi Peräkylä. I started by making another 
round of  analysis  of  my  data,  taking  the  idea  about  deontics  as  my  guiding  
star.  This  led  me to  focus  on  sequences  in  which  the  participants  discussed  
future actions, and I made collections of sequences starting with 
informings/announcements and proposals. In my analysis, I considered the 
ways in which these initiating actions were responded to by the recipients—
something that, in my interpretation, revealed participants’ orientations to 
their own and each other’s deontic rights. These considerations resulted in 
the first article of my dissertation (Article 5). The article was co-authored by 
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Anssi Peräkylä, who significantly contributed to the final formulation of the 
idea about deontics.  
The other five papers of this dissertation more or less overlapped with 
each  other.  Three  of  them  were  the  result  of  my  work  with  proposal  
sequences. After having expanded my collection of proposal sequences with 
new cases that I had initially ignored, I started to examine these sequences 
from three different perspectives: I investigated the ways in which they were 
brought to closure (Article 4), considered their overall trajectories (Article 3), 
and  studied  the  ways  in  which  they  were  initiated  (Article  2).  The  two  
remaining papers of this dissertation are about topics other than proposals 
and joint decision making. One of them is about humming as a way to 
manage participation and thus to deal with certain types of deontic claims 
(Article 1). Of all the papers included in this study, this is the paper with 
which I have worked the longest; I started to collect instances of humming as 
soon as I realized that I had such cases in my data, but without the help of 
Helena Kangasharju and Mai Frick, who later on gave me access to their data 
on  humming,  I  would  not  have  come  far  with  that  work.  Finally,  there  is  a  
paper that discusses how the idea about deontics relates to other types of 
social organization that may pertain to the ways in which people design their 
interactional conduct (Article 6). In this predominantly theoretical work, 
Anssi Peräkylä has, again, played an important role. The central idea of this 
paper  has  emerged  in  our  joint  discussions,  and,  as  a  co-author,  he  has  
clarified the concepts of the paper, edited the text especially with respect to 
its length, and contributed to the data analysis in essential ways. 
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3 DEONTIC RIGHTS IN INTERACTION: OVERVIEW OF THE 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
In  my  examination  of  people’s  orientations  to  their  own  and  each  other’s  
deontic  rights,  I  approach the issue from two different angles:  I  (1)  describe 
practices by which participants in interaction may claim (and mitigate their  
claims of) deontic rights in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of 
interaction and (2) discuss the ways in which participants may deploy the 
deontic rights that they have as interactional resources, as they design their 
communicative  actions  so  as  to  be  recognizable  as  such.  In  what  follows,  I  
will first provide an overview of the results of Articles 1-4, which deal with the 
former issue. Thereafter, I will turn to those articles that consider the latter 
issue (Articles 5 & 6).  Throughout my discussion,  I  aim to shed light on the 
interplay between authority and cooperation, as it appears from the point of 
view of people’s deontic orientations. 
 
 
3.1 Claiming deontic rights by virtue of what the participants do 
In this section, I will consider participants’ deontic rights as interactional 
achievements—that is, discuss the interactional practices by which these 
rights are established in face-to-face interactional encounters on a moment-
by-moment  basis.  My  focus  is  on  the  participants  managing  their  claims  of  
deontic  rights  by  virtue  of  what  they  do—something  associated  with  the  
notion of deontic stance (see Section 1.5). 
 
 
3.1.1 Deontic claims associated with encounter 
In Article 1, I examine the ways in which participants may deploy humming 
as an interactional resource. While our everyday understanding of humming 
involves the idea of people being happy in their thoughts, I argue that people 
can also make use of humming, as it were, “intentionally,” to achieve specific 
interactional  goals.  My  claim  is  based  on  the  empirical  observation  that,  in  
interactional encounters, the act of humming occurs systematically in 
connection with certain interactional problems and contributes to their 
solution. I suggest that this is because, through humming, the participants 
may redefine the participation framework of the problematic situations—
more specifically, they may mitigate those deontic claims that arise from the 
status of a social situation as an encounter. 
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While all human social life entails organization and constraint, these 
come into play most clearly when two or more people in a social situation 
jointly ratify one another as participants in an encounter—be it a game of 
tennis, an interview, or a psychotherapy session (Goffman 1964; Kendon 
1988: 24). There are several reasons for this. First, there are rules that govern 
the relationship between the encounters and the rest of the world; these rules 
concern things like the initiation and termination of encounters, the entrance 
and departure of particular participants, and the appropriateness of space 
and sound that must be observed relative to other people in the situation 
(Goffman 1964: 135). Second, encounters call for the participants to sustain 
the appearance of joint involvement in the activity at hand; this is regularly 
realized through a larger arrangement of the participants’ mutually aligned 
bodies (M. H. Goodwin 2006; C. Goodwin 2007). And third, there are 
normative expectations concerning the “naturally bounded interchanges” 
(Goffman 1981: 17) that take place in encounters; normally, these successive 
doings are “treated by the participants as being somehow linked together, 
often in such a way that  B’s  doing is  regarded as some sort  of  a  response to 
A’s previous doing” (Kendon 1988: 31). This is strongly related to the 
conversation analytic notions of “adjacency pair” and “sequence 
organization,”  which  involve  the  idea  of  speakers  posing  constraints  on  the  
speakers to come in terms of their next utterances (Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 
295-296; Heritage 1984: 245-253; Schegloff 2007: 9).8 All  this  means  that  
encounters are permeated by deontic considerations: every utterance that 
takes  place  in  an  interactional  encounter  involves  some  kind  of  an  implicit  
claim of deontic rights (while, of course, some utterances, like questions, do 
this more clearly than other utterances; see e.g., Heritage 2003), and each 
gaze, facial expression, gesture and body movement by which participants 
manage their involvement in the encounter, can also be treated as relevant in 
this respect. 
Notably, however, the precise extent to which a particular social 
situation is to be regarded as an encounter is something that is negotiated in 
the interaction then and there; people index their own level of engagement in 
                                                        
8 What binds the first  pair parts and second pair parts of an adjacency pair together into a 
coherent sequence is the conditional relevance of the second pair part upon the completion 
of  the  first  pair  part  (Schegloff  1968;  Schegloff  2007:  20-21)—a  principle  that  can  be  
regarded as a norm in all  focused interaction taking place in an encounter (Couper-Kuhlen 
2010:  36).  Notably,  the  notion  of  conditional  relevance  refers  only  to  items—that is, 
utterances or actions and their relationship with one another (Schegloff 2010: 39)—not to the 
actors who produce these items. In this study, however, my focus is precisely on the actors: it 
is the speakers of the first pair parts who put their recipients under normative constraints 
either  to  produce  relevant  second  pair  parts  or  to  become  accountable  for  not  doing  that  
(Heritage 1984: 245-253). 
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the  interaction,  as  well  as  the  level  of  engagement  that  they  expect  from  
others, both through their choices of action and through the ways they design 
these actions (Stivers & Rossano 2010b: 50: see also Goffman 1978; 
Ruusuvuori 2001). As recently suggested by Stivers and Rossano (2010a), 
speakers may choose to impose more or less rigid constraints on their 
recipients by the deployment of particular “response-mobilizing” features of 
turn-design: interrogative lexico-morphosyntax, interrogative prosody, 
recipient-directed speaker-gaze, and recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry. 
Instead of always using maximal pressure, speakers may occasionally want to 
give the recipients precisely the freedom not to respond. What this means is 
that  speakers  may  sometimes  want  to  downgrade  the  amount  of  deontic  
rights  that  they  implicitly  claim  by  their  doings,  and  that  this  shift  can  be  
understood  in  terms  of  reducing  the  extent  to  which  these  doings  are  to  be  
seen as taking place in an encounter. Besides, we may assume that modifying 
the status of the interaction can also be a way to resist other people’s deontic 
claims—I don’t need to respond to your utterance if we are not in an 
encounter with each other.  
My central claim in Article 1 is that humming can be used as an 
interactional resource to attain the above-described objectives. But why 
would  it  make  sense  for  people  to  try  to  blur  the  boundaries  between  the  
mere  social  situation  and  encounters?  As  I  point  out  in  my  study  on  
humming, interactions may involve different kinds of problems: co-
participants may not respond in adequate ways or they may be engaged in 
actions that appear ill-suited, or participants may also realize that they 
themselves cannot provide the expected responses or that their own actions 
are somehow inappropriate. Because, in encounters, the participants “have 
declared themselves officially open to one another for purposes of spoken 
communication and guarantee together to maintain a flow of words” 
(Goffman 1967: 34), all the deviations from this expectation may threaten the 
sense of the situation as a whole (Heritage 1984: 84-97). It is, therefore, that 
participants may occasionally want to redefine the current participation 
framework and try to remove the organization and constraint associated with 
encounters.  As  I  demonstrate  in  Article  1,  humming  can  be  deployed  as  a  
resource in solving such problems: it can be used to publicly “accept” the co-
participant’s solitary engagements, to maintain the separateness of the 
participants’ activities, to signal a need for “time out” from the joint activity, 
and—most importantly from the point of view of this study as a whole—to 
downgrade the deontic claims9 involved in one’s own embodied actions. 
                                                        
9 In  Article  1,  I  have  described  my  empirical  findings  without reference to the notion of 
deontics. This is because I submitted this paper (as well as Articles 2-4 discussed below) 
before the deontic authority paper (Article 5) was published. Therefore, in Article 1, instead 
of talking about the “deontic claims” that could be embodied in the participants’ interactional 
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Hence,  it  is  when  interactional  problems  emerge  that  it  can  be  most  
useful to mitigate the deontic significance of the participants’ doings by 
making the interaction appear ambiguous with regard to its status as an 
encounter. By this, the question is about solidarity, operating on the micro-
level  of  interaction.  According  to  Collins  (2004:  110),  “the  failure  of  
solidarity, down to the minute aspects of coordinating mutual participation in 
a conversation, is felt as a deep uneasiness or affront.” Or, as argued by 
Thomas  Scheff  (1990:  74),  even  a  “missed  beat  in  the  rhythm  of  
conversation” can lead “to the painful emotion of embarrassment, shame, or 
humiliation.” It thus seems important for the participants to try to do 
everything that can possibly be done to frame or mask their joint interaction 
as a successful one. 
 
 
3.1.2 Deontic claims associated with joint decision-making 
In Articles 2-4, I describe a number of interactional practices needed for the 
participants to be able to achieve and establish the “jointness” of their joint 
decisions. This genuine jointness—something that I refer to as “deontic 
symmetry”—is particularly important when it is required of the participants 
that  they  share  the  responsibility  for  what  is  to  be  decided.  However,  as  I  
demonstrate in Articles 2-4, achieving such jointness is quite complicated: it 
needs to be established right at the beginning of a potential decision-making 
sequence, as the participants make the important “meta-decision” about 
what to decide upon next; it must be actively maintained in the turn-by-turn 
unfolding  of  the  whole  decision-making  sequence;  and,  it  should  still  be  
preserved  at  the  point  at  which  the  participants  bring  the  decision-making  
sequence  to  closure.  In  Articles  2-4,  I  thus  examine  the  ways  in  which  
participants manage to maintain deontic symmetry in these different 
sequential loci. 
In  Article  2,  I  consider  the  interactional  practice  in  which  speakers  
construct their proposals as thoughts.  I  investigate  two  different  types  of  
conditional utterances in which a speaker presents a plan: (1) “asking 
conditionals” (jos ‘what if’ prefaced declarative conditionals and interrogative 
conditionals) and (2) “stating conditionals” (declarative conditionals). While 
asking conditionals mark the plan as contingent on the recipient’s approval 
and  involve  a  straightforward  request  for  the  recipient  to  engage  in  joint  
decision making about the proposed plan, stating conditionals are regularly 
treated as informings about plans in which the recipients have actually no 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct,  I  have  more  generally  referred  to  the  “interactional  import”  of  the  participants’  
doings.  
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say. However, when asking and stating conditionals are prefaced with 
references to the speakers’ thoughts (mä aattelin et ‘I was thinking that’), the 
projected responses and sequential trajectories are more open-ended: the 
participants are given the opportunity to share the responsibility for their 
interactional agenda. I suggest, however, that the exact ramifications of this 
particular practice are somewhat different in connection with asking 
conditionals and stating conditionals. In connection with asking conditionals, 
the speakers’ references to their thoughts function primarily to decrease the 
pressure on the recipients to engage in joint decision making; the recipients 
are given the freedom to enter into the process “voluntarily.” Then again, in 
connection with stating conditionals, the prefatory references to thoughts 
convey that the speakers’ plans can still be changed, also with respect to the 
recipients’ views; the recipients are thus invited, but not enforced, to engage 
in joint decision making about the matter at hand. 
As suggested by Lukes (2005: 23), any joint decision making is 
accompanied by a huge number of so-called “non-decisions”; there are always 
potential issues that the participants could discuss together but which “non-
decision making prevents from being actual.” From this point of view, one 
important precondition for deontic symmetry in joint decision making 
involves practices by which participants may jointly deal with such non-
decisions, as well. As I suggest in Article 2, the practice of constructing a 
proposal as a thought can be seen as one such practice; whether the speakers’ 
“reports”  on  their  private  mental  processes  will  lead  to  non-decisions  or  
whether  they  will  ultimately  count  as  sequence-initiating  actions  in  joint  
decision-making sequences is something that is essentially dependent on the 
co-participants’ willingness to cooperate with the first speakers by furthering 
their assumed projects (cf. Pomerantz 1980; Schegloff 2007: 81-90). But even 
if the recipients refrained from such cooperation, the situation would involve 
no overt threat to the participants’ “faces” (Goffman 1955; Brown & Levinson 
1987 [1978]): the recipients do not need to be overtly uncooperative; they 
may simply choose not to cooperate. 
Along the same lines, in Article 3, I examine the overall trajectories of 
decision-making sequences. At the beginning of a decision-making sequence, 
the speaker usually makes a proposal—that is, describes or names a course of 
a  desired  action  or  state  of  affairs,  while  suggesting  that  both  the  one  who  
makes the proposal and the one who receives it have a say in the decisions 
about  what  will  be  done  (Charles  et  al.  1997:  685–687).  In  Article  3,  I  thus  
examine what is needed for a proposal to get turned into a joint decision: how 
do people negotiate the outcome of the decision-making processes in terms of 
whether they indeed comprise new decisions and whether these decisions are 
genuinely joint ones? Simply put, a joint decision gets established when the 
recipient approves the first speaker’s proposal. However, as I demonstrate in 
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Article 3, such approving responses are quite complex: in order to establish a 
joint decision, the recipient needs to do three things: (1) establish access to 
the subject matter of the proposal, (2) express his or her agreement with the 
proposer’s views, and (3) display commitment to the proposed future action. 
These three components of approval become constitutive features of a joint 
decision. This means that there are several junctures in the decision-making 
sequence at which participants may engage in implicit negotiations about 
whether they will further the sequence into the direction of a new decision or 
drop the matter out of the decision-making agenda: these junctures are 
between the proposal and access, between the access and agreement, and 
between the agreement and commitment. If a proposal is abandoned before 
these components have been completed by the recipient, the outcome of the 
proposal is a non-decision. And then, if the recipient bypasses either the 
access or the agreement (or both) while yet displaying acquiescence in the 
proposer’s plan, the outcome of the proposal is a unilateral decision. 
I suggest that it is at the above-mentioned junctures, between the 
different components of approval, where the participants’ orientations to 
deontic symmetry are most obvious: while it is the first speaker who has set 
the initial frame for the joint decision making and thus contributed 
significantly both to the content of the emerging decision and to the fact that 
participants have started discussing the matter at hand, the participants seem 
to orient to the expectation that, after that, it is primarily the task of the 
recipient to  lead  the  sequence  in  the  direction  of  a  new  decision.  The  first  
speaker, in other words, relies on the recipient’s cooperation when it comes 
to furthering her assumed project (cf. Pomerantz 1980; Schegloff 2007: 
81-90). This gives the recipient several opportunities to exercise power 
through  “non-actions”  (cf.  Lukes  2005:  20-25)  without  yet  causing  overt  
threat to the participants’ faces; instead of accepting or rejecting the first 
speaker’s proposal, the recipient may, for example, pose a question about the 
content of the proposal and thereby start a side-sequence, without necessarily 
ever  coming  back  to  the  main  sequence.  While  letting  the  recipient  initiate  
the  return  to  the  main  sequence,  the  first  speaker  may  be  sure  that  the  
emerging decision (inasmuch as it actually emerges) is genuinely a joint 
one—that is, the first speaker has not been imposing her plans on the 
recipient. Besides, and most importantly, in this way, the participants can 
also establish joint “non-decisions”—that is, share the responsibility for their 
implicit decisions not to  talk  about  the  proposed  issue  anymore.  This  
happens when the first speakers cooperate with the recipients and take 
seriously the implications of their (lack of) conduct and, therefore, 
“voluntarily” refrain from pursuing their proposals anymore. 
Finally, in Article 4, I study the prosodic features of the turns at talk by 
which new decisions are declared as established and the decision-making 
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sequences  as  ripe  for  closure.  From  the  verbal  point  of  view,  these,  what  I  
refer to as “approval turns” are typically either action declarations (“yea, let’s 
take it”) or positive evaluations (“yea, that’s good”). However, by modifying 
the prosodic delivery of their approval turns, the recipients can fine-tune 
their  responsive actions in terms of  the extent to which these turns actually  
signal the emergence of new decisions and implicate sequence closure. In 
Article 4, I examine the interactional import of three prosodic patterns that 
are  common  in  the  approval  turns  of  my  data.  When  the  recipients  deliver  
their  approval  turns  with  a  (1)  dynamic prosody (increased loudness, 
excessive pitch movement), they signal the emergence of a new decision and 
implicate sequence closure, irrespective of whether the lexical format of the 
turn is an action declaration or a positive evaluation. Then again, by 
delivering their approval turns with a (2) flat prosody (decreased loudness, 
minimal pitch movement), the recipients do not immediately establish new 
decisions. It is only after these turns are supplemented with further talk that 
the participants write down the new decisions; but even after that, the 
decision-making sequences are not effectively brought to a close. 
Paradoxically, however, when the recipients signal their approval with a (3) 
flat-stylized prosody (stylized figure, embedded in flat prosodic features), 
they signal both the emergence of new decisions and sequence closure. This 
surprising similarity between the sequential consequences of dynamic and 
flat-stylized approval turns is something that I seek to account for with 
reference to emotion: I argue that the similarity of the sequential 
consequences of the dynamic and flat-stylized approval turns is related to the 
fact that, in both cases, the speakers display a clear emotional stance toward 
the matter at hand—even though the “valences” of these stances differ from 
each other. Then again, if the emotional stance is not clear in the recipient’s 
utterance, the first speaker keeps on pursuing a more adequate response 
from the recipient. 
The  closure  of  the  decision-making  sequence  is  thus  yet  another  locus  
where the participants may cooperate in trying to achieve and maintain 
deontic symmetry. While it is the task of the recipient to lead the sequence in 
the direction of a new decision (see the discussion above), it is also his task to 
display his ultimate approval of the first speaker’s proposal in a way that 
appears truly sincere—something that is most effectively accomplished 
through the prosodic displays of emotion. Only this can warrant for the 
jointness of the new decision. However, the recipient may also do a little bit 
less than is needed for sequence closure and thus communicate to the first 
speaker, in a subtle way, that she may still need to provide further reasons for 
her idea before the decision about it can be settled.  
In sum, the emergence of any joint decision is a result of a specific 
decision-making  sequence—something  that  is  not  always  actualized  but  can  
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still be oriented to as an entity by the participants. Importantly, the rules that 
hold such a sequence together cannot be described merely with reference to 
the relation of the conditional relevance between the proposal and its 
approval. Instead, the sequence can be abandoned at many junctures without 
this  abandoning  ever  needing  to  surface.  And,  arguably,  it  is  precisely  this  
vagueness and ambiguity that is absolutely crucial for the participants to be 
able to establish and maintain deontic symmetry at different loci in the 
decision-making sequence—both in terms of the control over the decision-
making agenda and in terms of the impact on the sequential outcome. 
 
 
3.2 Having deontic rights by virtue of who the participants are 
Previously, I discussed the ways in which participants in interaction may 
claim deontic rights by virtue of what they do. Some of these claims arise 
from the status of the interaction as an encounter; other claims are more 
clearly related to the specific activity that the participants are engaged in. In 
both types of instances, the deontic claims emerge from the way in which the 
participants design their interactional contributions. While this way of 
thinking is in line with the general ethnomethodological and conversation 
analytic spirit of paying less attention to social scientific theorizing on social 
life and, instead, treating it as something that people achieve through their 
everyday practices (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; Heritage 1984), in this study, 
however, I have also wanted to consider the other side of the coin. The reason 
for this is quite plain: while conversation analysis is first and foremost about 
trying to capture the participants’ own orientations  to  what  is  going  on  in  
interaction (see e.g., Garfinkel & Sacks 1970: 345; Schegloff 1997), I believe 
that this is not possible without any theorizing about these orientations. This 
is because the participants’ orientations may quite likely exceed the 
boundaries  of  video  recording.  Indeed,  the  need  to  find  a  way  to  deal  with  
these kinds of orientations systematically is something that has become 
relatively clear with some of the contemporary developments in the domain 
of conversation analysis, which involve, most notably, the research revolving 
around the notions of action formation and action recognition. 
In principle, action formation and action recognition is not a new topic 
in the domain of conversation analysis, and conversation analysts have long 
observed how participants in interaction design their turns at talk so as to be 
recognizable as specific actions. Still, the exact mechanisms of action 
formation have mostly been unknown (Levinson 2012; Heritage 2012a). 
While the rigorous principles of sequential analysis have provided 
conversation analysts with a way to make claims about what specific turns at 
 51 
 
talk  are  doing  locally,  in  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  growing  interest  in  
looking  beyond  the  “next  turn  proof  procedure”  (Sacks  et  al.  1974:  729),  to  
find out why it is that some utterance is heard as conveying a certain action 
and not something else. As expected, conversation analysts have mostly 
concentrated on the features of the participants’ publicly observable conduct 
that might bear on the mechanisms of action formation and action 
recognition. Besides the sequential structures, linguistic constructions and 
lexical choices, conversation analysts have considered a wide range of other 
semiotic resources (prosody, gaze, body movements, etc.) that people may 
use when they try to make their actions recognizable to others (Levinson 
2012).  However,  the  recent  work  of  Heritage  (2012a)  is  exceptional  in  this  
respect; Heritage has shown that participants’ judgments about their 
respective epistemic statuses are absolutely crucial for their understanding 
whether, for example, a declarative utterance is to be interpreted as a 
question or not. Furthermore, most interestingly, Heritage’s work raises the 
question about the possibility of other comparable resources for action 
formation and action recognition. As suggested by Sidnell (2012: 54), such 
“action recognition machinery” might consist of a suite of different kinds of 
action-recognition heuristics, which might sometimes cluster, resulting in 
easily identifiable “speech act”-like products, and sometimes generate “near-
unique one-offs that seem not to fit in any one speech act category clearly.” In 
this study, I consider one such heuristic. My essential argument is that, 
besides the deontic rights that are constructed locally by virtue of what the 
participants do (deontic stance), there are also deontic rights that arise from 
who the participants are (deontic status), and these rights have an impact on 
how the participants’  publicly  observable conduct is  interpreted by their  co-
participants.  This  theoretical  idea  lies  at  the  heart  of  Articles  5  and  6, 
which I have written together with my supervisor, Professor Anssi Peräkylä. 
In Article 5, we examine the recipients’ responses to proposals and 
assertions dealing with future actions or states of affairs. While proposals 
(declaratives or interrogatives in the conditional mood) imply that there is a 
decision to be made, and that this decision is contingent upon the recipient, it 
makes relevant the recipient’s approval of the decision. As suggested in 
Articles 2-4, it is through proposals and approvals that the participants can 
establish a relatively symmetrical distribution of deontic rights between 
them.  The  situation  is,  however,  more  complex  with  assertions,  which  state  
future facts without any contingencies (declaratives in the indicative mood). 
When such a turn is responded to with a compliance token, such as selvä 
“alright,” the recipient displays his awareness of the fact that the first 
speaker’s assertion has consequences for him, which he thereby accepts. 
Through  his  “compliance  token”  (Schegloff  2007:  7;  see  also  Beach  1993:  
329-330; Sorjonen 2001: 111-112; Stivers 2006), the recipient establishes the 
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first speaker’s deontic authority in the matter at hand.10 When an assertion is, 
however, responded to with an information receipt token, such as aha “I see,” 
the recipient treats the matter as being outside of the “deontic domain” and 
thus refrains from acknowledging any speaker-tilted deontic asymmetry. This 
means  that  utterances  with  the  same  key  design  features  can  be  heard  and  
treated differently depending on the participants’ judgments about their 
respective deontic rights in the domain in question. 
In Article 6, we outline a conceptual framework revolving around three 
orders in the organization of human action: epistemic order, deontic order, 
and emotional order.11 We claim that participants make judgments about 
their epistemic, deontic and emotional statuses relative to each other and use 
these judgments as resources as they design their utterances to perform 
certain actions.  At  the same time,  they also take the possible deployment of  
these resources into account as they interpret their co-participants’ 
utterances as actions. Moreover, we invoke the notion of the “momentary 
relationship of the participants”—something that emerges out of the 
participants’ respective epistemic, deontic, and emotional statuses at some 
point in the interaction—in order to build a bridge between the local and 
wider aspects of social organization that bear on human action. On this basis, 
we demonstrate how the participants’ momentary relationships can be 
negotiated through the ways in which the first speakers’ deployment of their 
epistemic, deontic, and emotional statuses is acknowledged by their co-
participants. If the recipients refrain from acknowledging the first speakers’ 
epistemic, deontic, or emotional statuses, which have, nevertheless, been 
central to the first speakers’ ways of designing their utterances, the 
participants’  momentary  relationships  are  modified  with  respect  to  these  
aspects.  The  advantages  of  such  theorizing  are  twofold.  On the  one  hand,  it  
enables us to conceptualize the manifold of the ways in which participants’ 
social relationships are built-in in the organization of human action—that is, 
how they pertain to the processes of action formation and action recognition. 
On the other hand, the idea about three distinct social orders helps us to 
                                                        
10 Importantly, however, the comparison between the English and Finnish ways of displaying 
compliance may not be quite straightforward and requires further investigation. In research 
on medical interaction, for example, the findings on doctors pursuing the patients’ “okays” 
after treatment decisions (see Stivers 2006) have not been replicated in equivalent Finnish 
data (see Ijäs-Kallio et al. 2011). 
11 This  framework  has  roots  in  an  analytic  division  that  has  been  originally  developed  by  
Johanna Ruusuvuori and Anssi Peräkylä for purposes of teaching conversation analysis at 
the Universities of Tampere and Helsinki. The original model, listing three aspects of social 
interaction that are fundamental in constructing social relationships: emotion, control, and 
epistemic  rights,  has  also  appeared  in  a  recent  Finnish  edited  volume in  social  psychology  
(see Ruusuvuori 2012). 
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account for the kind of relationship negotiations that involve a complex 
interface between knowledge, power, and emotion. 
Our theoretical framework is well-suited to the analysis of implicit 
power negotiations between participants. In many cases, the question is 
about  the  second  speakers  somehow  resisting  the  kind  of  distribution  of  
deontic rights that the first speakers have suggested. While the second 
speakers may display their analysis of the prior speakers’ utterances by 
responding to them in certain ways, it is also possible that “the treatment that 
a bit of talk gets in a next utterance may be quite different from the way in 
which  it  was  heard”  (Goodwin  &  Goodwin  1987:4).  Instead  of  presenting  a  
naked analysis of the prior talk, the next utterances may also deal with it, not 
in its own terms, but in the way in which it is more liable for the intentions of 
the subsequent speaker (see e.g., Stivers 2005; Waring 2005; 2007; Stivers & 
Hayashi 2010; Heritage & Raymond 2012). Participants may blur, conceal or 
otherwise avoid displaying their true appreciation of the interactional import 
of the earlier talk and “avoid taking up and dealing with what they perfectly 
well  know is  accomplished or implicated by prior talk so as to influence the 
direction of talk towards some desired objective” (Heritage 1984: 260). In 
Articles 5 and 6, we consider this way of responding: we analyze instances in 
which second speakers, while agreeing with the content of the first speakers’ 
utterances, ingeniously challenge the first speakers’ claims of deontic rights. 
For example, as we demonstrate in Article 5, the second speaker’s evaluation 
of the first speaker’s unilateral decision can be a way for the second speaker 
to indicate that she has actually a word to say in the first speaker’s decision; 
no  matter  how  positive  such  an  evaluation  might  be,  it  serves  as  a  vital  
demonstration of the fact that no “surrender of private judgement” (Lukes 
1978: 639-640) is occurring (see Section 1.3.1). And, indeed, it is precisely the 
apparent cooperativeness of the second speakers’ evaluations that make this 
strategy particularly “effective;” it makes it almost impossible for the first 
speakers to address the second speakers’ resistance directly at the meta-level. 
At  the  same  time,  we  may  assume  that  situations  where  someone’s  
deontic status is not acknowledged by their co-participants in the ways that 
they have expected can be experienced as painful—especially if the person has 
been maintaining expectations that go along with a particular identity that 
they have adopted (cf. Douzinas 2002: 385). Luckily, however, human social 
interaction is organized in a way that allows the participants to minimize the 
amount of embarrassment that such situations might generate (cf. Goffman 
1956). Namely, as pointed out by Tomasello (2008: 79), in all human 
communication, the relationship between the participants’ overt interactional 
conduct and what they postulate to be its shared, intersubjective context, the 
so-called “common ground” (Clark 1996; Enfield 2006) is complementary: 
“as more can be assumed to be shared between communicator and recipient, 
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less needs to be overtly expressed.” Tomasello (2008: 79) even suggests that 
“if enough is shared in common ground, the overt expression of either motive 
or referent may be totally eliminated without diminishing the message at all.” 
Therefore, a highly authoritative speaker may assume that his deontic status 
alone is enough for the recipient to understand that, for example, his 
apparently tentative interrogative conditional utterance is actually to be 
understood as a command. But then again, a less authoritative person may 
realize that they need to produce an imperative in order to be understood. It 
is thus the complementarity and relative weight of deontic stances and 
deontic statuses that constitutes a fundamental mechanism by which people 
may negotiate their deontic rights. Thereby, the central question is whether 
someone’s deontic status is treated as something that can overrule the 
deontic  stance or whether the deontic  stance is  to be taken at  its  face value.  
Because both options are equally supported by the formal organization of 
interaction, the participants may indeed engage in tough power negotiations 
without yet causing any overt threat to anyone’s face (Goffman 1955; Brown 
& Levinson 1987 [1978]). 
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4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 Face and solidarity 
Human social interaction involves many different kinds of threats to face and 
solidarity  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  ordered  in  ways  that  allow  the  
participants to minimize these threats (Heritage 1984: 265-280; Goll & Meier 
1997; Clayman 2002). As has been well described in the conversation analytic 
research literature, there are several aspects in the sequence organization 
which function as resources for the participants to promote cooperative 
actions and suppress uncooperative actions. For example, the conversation 
analytic studies on preference organization have shown that, in general, 
cooperative responsive actions tend to be performed more straightforwardly 
and faster than uncooperative responsive actions, which are often produced 
indirectly, with hesitations and delays (Pomerantz 1984a; Davidson 1984; 
Bilmes 1988; Schegloff 2007: 58-96; see also Ogden 2006); the delayed 
positioning not only mitigates the force of an uncooperative response, but 
also facilitates the avoidance of such a response altogether (Clayman 2002: 
235). Other solidarity-promoting aspects of sequence organization include 
prefaces, pre-sequences and other preliminaries, which systematically favor 
cooperative outcomes: they enable the participants to determine in advance 
whether  their  requests,  invitations,  etc.  are  likely  to  be  accepted,  and  then  
proceed with those actions only if the prospects for cooperative responses are 
good (Schegloff 2007: 28-57). What also minimizes the interaction-related 
threats to solidarity is people’s tendency to mitigate their uncooperative 
actions, for example, by explanatory accounts (Heritage 1988; Houtkoop 
1990). 
In this study, I have described further interactional tools that help the 
participants to maintain their mutual solidarity—in this case, in the face of 
potentially problematic negotiations on people’s deontic rights. In Article 1, I 
have talked about how people may deploy humming as an interactional 
resource to deal with potentially embarrassing interactional problems which 
could  threaten  the  sense  of  the  situation  as  a  whole.  In  Articles  2-4,  I  have  
discussed the ways in which participants in joint decision making may 
negotiate the trajectories and outcomes of decision making sequences 
without needing to engage in any overtly uncooperative actions.12 In Article 2, 
                                                        
12 At  the  same  time,  these  articles  also  deal  with  another  aspect  of  solidarity—that  which  
involves the sharing of power (McCay  1988;  Berkes  1997;  Borrini-Feyerabend et  al.  2007;  
Shindler  &  Cheek  1999).  While  Honneth  (1995:  129)  has  suggested  that  “social  relations  of  
symmetrical  esteem” constitute  a  prerequisite  for  solidarity,  we  may  safely  assume that  an  
integral part of that symmetry consists of the relatively symmetrical distribution of power 
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I have considered one practice—that of constructing a proposal as a thought—
by which first speakers may suggest joint decision making about some topic 
without yet making their recipients accountable for their possible non-
cooperation in this regard. Similarly, in Article 3, I have examined the ways 
in  which  the  participants  can  cooperatively  drop  a  topic  from  the  decision-
making  agenda.  Then,  in  Article  4,  I  have  described  the  subtle  prosodic  
means through which a recipient, who ostensibly approves the first speaker’s 
proposal, may communicate to the first speaker that still further reasons are 
needed before the final decision on the matter can be treated as established. 
And, lastly, in Articles 5 and 6, Anssi Peräkylä and myself have discussed the 
complementarity and the relative weight of deontic stances and deontic 
statuses as something that constitutes a central mechanism by which people 
may negotiate the power-related aspects of their mutual relationships 
without causing any overt threat to anyone’s face. All these practices and 
mechanisms are directly linked to the fundamentally cooperative nature of 
the human communication system, where it is the participants’ joint goal to 
get  the  communicator’s  message  across  (Grice  1975)  and  which  thus  allows  
the participants to minimize their potentially face-threatening interactional 
contributions. 
 
 
4.2 Beyond agnosticism 
One of the basic ideas of conversation analysis is that social interactions are 
organized in an orderly way and that this orderliness can be discovered by the 
close analysis of the rules and structures of naturally occurring interactions 
(e.g.,  Heritage  1984;  Psathas  1995;  Schegloff  2007).  While  the  early  
conversation analytic studies have mainly focused on the sequential 
organization of talk, the broader features of social context, such as power, 
have been paid less attention to. In general, conversation analysts have 
rejected the “bucket theory of context” (Heritage 1987; Goodwin & Heritage 
1990: 286) in which pre-existing circumstances and social frameworks are 
seen as determining and enclosing the interaction from above. Instead, 
conversation analysis has approached context as locally produced and 
constantly transformable in interaction. Rather than seeing the context as an 
abstract social force, which imposes itself on the participants, conversation 
analysts have usually begun from the other direction and observed how 
participants actively display their orientations to the context, to one another 
and hence also to the analyst (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998: 147). This means 
                                                                                                                                                             
within  these  relations—something  that  can  be  partly  captured  by  my  notion  of  “deontic  
symmetry.” 
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that contextual features are not considered so relevant for the research as 
long as the participants in the interaction do not orient to their relevance in 
their publicly observable behavior (see Schegloff 1968; 1991; 1997); one needs 
to take “relevance-to-the-parties as the warrant for relevance-for-the-analyst 
in order to specify how the orientation to a context has become consequential 
for the participants’ conduct” (Arminen 2000: 446). Thus, when it comes to 
“higher level” social phenomena, such as power, researchers should not 
assume the significance of any such variable a priori; instead, the issue is one 
for empirical  investigation.  No matter how good this  all  sounds,  in practice,  
however,  this  initial  conversation  analytic  skepticism  has  often  led  to  some  
kind of “agnosticism”—that is, to a claim that the existence of the higher level 
social phenomena is actually unknowable (Hutchby 1998: 86). Furthermore, 
this agnosticism has usually appeared in combination with a deep reluctance 
to engage in any social scientific theorizing, which has led many sociologists 
to  question  the  whole  bearing  of  conversation  analysis  on  what  might  be  
called the sociological agenda (Hutchby 1999a: 87; for debates, see Schegloff 
1997; Schegloff 1998; Wetherell 1998; Billig 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1999a, 
1999b). 
Inasmuch as power relations are seen as matters that actually determine 
the courses of interactional encounters, I wholeheartedly agree with the 
conversation analysts’ warnings against taking such relations for granted. I 
also subscribe to the conversation analytic idea that power relations cannot 
exist outside of concrete interactional practices; power relations are not 
natural but oriented-to features of interaction. Where I disagree, however, is 
with  the  view  according  to  which  power  relations  could  not  be  taken  as  
“given” by the participants themselves.  Even  if  such  relations  do  not  
determine, or one-sidedly influence, the participants’ concrete interactional 
performances from above, in this study, I have argued that these relations—
as they pertain to the participants’ deontic statuses—are sometimes used as 
resources for action formation and action recognition. Thus, it is at those 
particular  moments  of  interaction,  when  the  participants  make  use  of  their  
deontic statuses in order to design their turns at talk as intelligible social 
actions, and take the deployment of the same resources into account as they 
interpret their co-participants’ actions, that the participants indeed orient to 
their power relations as pre-established13—even if this relation is 
continuously changing as a result of each new contribution in the 
interactional sequence. Importantly, in my view, the participants still have 
the freedom of choice with respect to the resources that they want to deploy 
                                                        
13 This is something that has also been pointed out, for example, in the research on doctor-
patient interaction, where patients have been shown to design their own diagnostic proposals 
at the beginning of the medical consultation consistently as tentative, in this way displaying 
orientation to the doctors’ medical authority (Ruusuvuori 2000: 30). 
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and consider in these processes (e.g., whether to rely on the deontic status as 
a resource and utter an interrogative conditional in order to perform a 
command, or to upgrade the deontic stance and issue an imperative to 
implement the same action). 
This idea can be clarified with reference to two broad dimensions of 
context that Hanks (2006) has called emergence and embedding. Emergence 
designates aspects of context that arise from production and reception of 
utterances as ongoing processes. This dimension of context is usually 
associated with the idea of the speaking subject’s communicative 
intentionality. Conversation analysts in particular have long emphasized the 
view according to which participants can endow the tiniest details of their 
talk and conduct with relevance. Embedding, then again, describes the ways 
in which utterances are framed in some broader contexts. This dimension of 
context is thus associated with social theoretical debates on the extent to 
which  social  actors  and  actions  are  determined  by  external  social  forces.  
Hence, there seems to be an initial alignment of emergence with the local 
aspects of interaction and embedding with the global aspects. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out by Hanks, this might not be the most fruitful way of thinking 
about context; there is no reason to think that emergence could not be 
observed at the global level and embedding at the local level. Thus, to situate 
my  argument  within  Hanks’s  considerations,  I  have  suggested  that  also  the  
global aspects of interaction, such as people’s power relationships, can be 
associated with emergence and communicative intentionality. Even if people 
might be thrust into positions and social relations that are independent of 
their intentional states and that thus define them from above, people can still 
make  use  of  these  “social  facts”  (Durkheim  1982  [1895]),  as  it  were,  
intentionally. The social world in which an interaction is embedded does not 
determine what participants do—something that also applies to the notion of 
“culture” as a potential source of behavior (Collins 2004: 143). Instead, just 
like the constitutive rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess 
(Searle 1995: 27-28), the social world enables people’s doings through the 
resources that it offers to them—resources that people may deploy in 
unpredictable ways.  
The talk about such an “immaterial” thing as a person’s deontic status 
as an interactional  resource raises the question whether something like that  
can really be treated as comparable to “material” resources, such as verbal 
utterances, facial expressions, and hand gestures, that people may resort to in 
order to implement social actions. Is there any empirical evidence to support 
the “reality” of deontic statuses—besides, the ways in which they help to 
account for some systematic features in the data, as demonstrated in Articles 
5  and  6?  Even  if  such  evidence  cannot  be  provided  by  using  the  qualitative  
methodology of conversation analysis, something like this has been offered 
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by recent studies in social neuroscience: they point to the importance of the 
identity of the speaker as the recipient seeks to interpret that person’s spoken 
message. For example, 4-month-old infants have been found to have quite 
different brain responses to their own mother’s voice compared to unfamiliar 
voices  (Purhonen  et  al.  2004;  2005).  Moreover,  it  has  been  shown  that  
listeners make immediately stereotype-dependent inferences about a 
speaker,  and  bring  the  associated  stereotypes  to  bear  on  what  is  being  said  
(Van Berkum et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that a 
listener’s interpretations of a speaker’s utterances are strongly influenced by 
whether the listener likes the speaker or not: we tend to interpret the 
behavior of the people we like by using higher-level mentalistic descriptions 
of their thoughts, goals and emotions (e.g., ringing a doorbell to see if 
someone  is  at  home).  In  contrast,  we  tend  to  interpret  the  behavior  of  the  
people we do not like by using lower-level mechanistic descriptions of their 
publicly observable behavior (e.g., moving a finger) (Marsch et al. 2010). All 
this suggests that many aspects of the social world “out there” are inherently 
connected to the mechanisms of action formation and action recognition. 
Now, there is something in the latter-mentioned study of Marsch and 
her co-workers (2010) that seems to be worth noting. From the point of view 
of  that  study,  to  be  interested  in  only  what  is  publicly  observable  in  the  
participants’ talk and conduct implies an attitude towards the research 
subjects that appears quite disturbing: the researchers themselves may not 
like those people whose interactional conduct they are analyzing, but it is 
possible that the participants themselves like each other. Therefore, in order 
to really make sense of the ways in which participants design their turns at 
talk as intelligible social actions, researchers should be sensitive to who the 
participants  are  to  each  other.  Even  if  the  focus  of  analysis  is  on  the  
fundamental structures of conversation, it is also important, as recently 
pointed out by Stivers and Rossano (2010b: 55), to recognize that “people are 
performing actions to, with, and for others. Who these people are to each 
other and what their respective projects are, matter both to the interactants 
and for the interaction, and thus inescapably for those who are committed to 
the analysis of their conduct.” 
 
 
4.3 On the origins of deontic rights 
The  way  of  thinking  about  the  participants’  deontic  rights  that  has  been  
adopted in this study allows the researcher to consider the interactional 
consequences of  people’s  orientations  to  their  own and  each  other’s  deontic  
rights. What is left open, however, are the exact origins of someone’s deontic 
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rights—whether they emerge, for example, out of the participants’ 
institutional roles or from something that one of the participants has just 
previously said. While something about these origins has been elucidated in 
those social scientific studies mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation 
which deal with the macro-structural and macro-interactional bases of power 
(see  Section  1.2),  at  this  point,  however,  I  will  turn  to  discuss  two  recent  
conversation analytic studies that can shed light on the more local origins of 
the participants’ deontic rights. 
First, there is the most recent study by Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen 
(forthcoming). Drawing on a large database of conversational American 
English, Couper-Kuhlen has considered the linguistic forms that people 
deploy to implement what she calls “directive-commissive” actions (cf. Searle 
1976), which have in common the aim to bring about something in the future, 
be it temporally immediate and intrinsic to the speech-event situation, or 
temporally “remote” and at a remove from the speech-event situation (cf. 
Houtkoop  1987;  Lindström  1999:  104-139;  Egbert  2011).  Couper-Kuhlen  
found  that,  even  if  there  are  multiple  formats  used  in  turn  design  for  each  
action type, each action type still has certain “preferred” formats. 
Nevertheless, there is some overlap between the preferred formats for 
different action types; for example, you should X can be used to implement a 
request, a suggestion and a proposal. The same applies to do you want/need 
X, which can be used to implement requests, offers and proposals. According 
to  Couper-Kuhlen,  the  most  “polysemous”  of  the  recurrent  directive-
commissive action formats are positive imperatives. Yet, even if similar 
linguistic forms can be used to implement these different kinds of actions, 
nevertheless, the participants in mundane interaction can usually distinguish 
between  them  without  major  problems.  One  of  the  reasons  for  this  is  what  
can be called the “beneficiary heuristic” (Sidnell 2012: 54); as the participants 
design  their  turns  at  talk  so  as  to  be  recognizable  as  specific  social  actions,  
they pay attention to who will bear the costs of the future action in question 
and  to  whom  its  benefits  will  accrue.  Thus,  while  both  offers  and  requests  
advocate something that the recipient should do, in offers, these doings will 
benefit the recipient and, in requests, they will benefit the speaker. Proposals, 
then again, advocate something that should be of benefit for both 
participants. Another reason for the ease with which the participants in 
everyday conversations can deal with the above-mentioned polysemy is what 
can be called the “responsible agent heuristic” (Sidnell 2012: 54); they design 
their utterances also with respect to who will execute the action being 
planned—whether it will be both of the participants or only one of them. So, 
while requests and suggestions call for the recipient’s actions, in offers, it is 
the speaker who needs to act and, in proposals, it is both participants. 
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Then, there is the study by Curl and Drew (2008). As mentioned earlier, 
this  work  analyses  the  choices  between  two  request  forms:  simple  forms  
prefaced with modal verbs (e.g., Could you do X?) and more complex forms 
prefaced with specific markers of deference (e.g., I was wondering if you 
could do X). Initially, Curl and Drew found a broad association of these forms 
with specific interactional settings: the simple modal forms were more 
common among family members, while the more complex accounts of 
wondering  were  typical  in  calls  to  a  doctor’s  surgery.  Now,  out  of  this,  one  
could draw different kinds of conclusions: one might assume that it is the 
context and the participants’ roles in these settings that determined their 
linguistic choices, as it were, from above, or, one could suggest that it is 
through  these  choices  that  the  participants’  constructed  their  mundane  and  
institutional identities (He & Keating 1991; Schegloff 1991; Ochs 1993: 288; 
He  1995;  Antaki  &  Widdicombe  1998;  Zimmerman  1998;  Bucholtz  1999;  
Bucholtz  &  Hall  2004;  Waring  2005;  Cook  2006:  269;  Saito  2012).  
Interestingly enough, Curl and Drew did not pay much attention to either of 
these  options.  Instead,  by  comparing  their  everyday  data  with  their  
institutional  data,  they  came  up  with  a  more  local  explanation  of  the  
participants’ choices of request form. They argued that these choices not only 
involved a claim to the speakers’ entitlement to make the request but, in 
addition, they reflected the speakers’ awareness of the range of contingencies 
that the recipients might have in granting the request. Crucial evidence for 
this more local explanation came from those medical interactions where the 
speaker used the simple request format and observably oriented to the 
recipient’s granting of the request as self-evident, as well as from those 
everyday conversations where the speaker used the more complex format and 
noticeably oriented to the recipient’s compliance as somehow contingent. 
Thus, as recently pointed out by Peräkylä (2011: 372-373) in his description 
of the study, “by not terminating their analysis prematurely by using 
‘institutional context’ as an overall explanation, Curl and Drew were able to 
show in detail what the participants locally oriented to in their choice of 
request form.” 
Hence, while Ervin-Tripp (1976) has argued that the speaker’s choice of 
the directive form is dependent on “the relative power of speaker and 
addressee” (Ervin-Tripp 1976: 29), in light of the above-described studies, the 
situation seems much more complicated than that. To apply the central 
concepts of this dissertation, it seems that the relative strength of the 
speaker’s deontic stance (for  definition,  see  Section  1.5)  is  informed  by  the  
interplay between at least three different kinds of considerations that are 
relatively independent of any structural power relationships between the 
participants: the participants’ agent roles (who will perform the action in 
question), the allocation of costs and benefits between them (who will benefit 
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from the action), as well as the contingencies surrounding the actualization of 
the future action in question (whether the action is easy or difficult to 
perform). What I want to add in this (already complex) picture, are two 
general ideas. First, what two participants are to each other at a particular 
interactional moment may not always be exhausted by the “local” 
considerations alone, for there might be other considerations that can trump 
one  or  other  of  the  local  considerations.  For  example,  as  can  be  seen  in  
Articles 2-4, in the planning meetings between pastors and cantors, an 
utterance about a future action can be treated as a proposal, not so much 
because the action in question would be performed by the participants 
together  or  because  it  would  benefit  them both,  but  simply  because  both  of  
the participants—by virtue of their institutional roles—have a word to say in 
the matter.14 Second, people’s deontic stances do not necessarily mirror their 
understanding of their deontic statuses relative to their co-participants: for 
example, as discussed in Articles 5 and 6, there are declarative requests for 
action15 which get their deontic strength from the participants’ relative 
deontic statuses, not from the deontic stances that they embody. 
As  pointed  out  above  (see  Section  4.2),  the  participants’  social  
relationships are not only a concern for them themselves but, besides, for 
those who study these people’s interactional conduct. Given the limits of 
empirical interaction data, it is here that the theoretical notion of deontic 
status is particularly helpful. Besides enabling us to account for situations 
where the design of an utterance or an expression (deontic stance) does not 
directly tell about its deontic strength, the notion of deontic status allows us 
to think about the potential origins of people’s deontic rights without needing 
to limit ourselves only to what is publicly observable in the participants’ 
conduct. Thereby, it allows us to draw linkages between theorizing about the 
social world, associated with the social sciences and organizational studies, 
on the one hand, and the examination of the minor details of the participants’ 
publicly observable conduct, associated with conversation analysis, on the 
other. Some of these linkages might even have some “emancipatory” potential 
(on “emancipatory” conversation analysis, see Kitzinger & Frith 1999; 
Weatherall 2000; 2002; Stokoe 2000; Kitzinger 2000; 2009; Stokoe & 
Smithson 2001; Stokoe & Weatherall 2002; Tanaka & Fukushima 2002; 
Speer 2002; 2005; Ohara & Saft 2003; Tainio 2003; Land & Kitzinger 2007; 
                                                        
14 Of  course,  this  should  not  be  taken to  mean that  this  “primary”  consideration  could  not  
overlap with the agency and beneficiary considerations. 
15 A good example for such a request,  which is drawn from the study of Ervin-Tripp (1976: 
29), is the situation in which a customer says to a bartender: “I’ll have a Burgie.” The same 
utterance by the same customer—even in the very same physical environment—may not have 
any  deontic  implications  at  all  if  it  is  said  by  the  customer  to  their  companion—to  inform  
their companion about their intentions with respect to a beer. 
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Guimaraes  2007;  Kitzinger  &  Wilkinson  2008).  Given  that  a  person  with  a  
high deontic status may assume that his status alone is enough to warrant for 
the deontic significance of his utterances, we may think about the kind of 
power relations that are maintained, for example, by recommendations to be 
found  in  the  most  celebrated  guides  to  relationships,  such  as  John  Gray’s  
(1992) Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus. 
 
Women often  think  they  are  asking  for  support  when they  are  not.  When she  needs  
support,  a woman may present the problem but not directly ask for his support.  She 
expects him to offer his support and neglects directly to ask for it. (Gray 1992: 165.) 
 
As pointed out above, there are indeed situations where a person’s 
deontic status is not acknowledged as a resource for action formation and 
action  recognition  in  the  way  that  the  speaker  has  expected.  But,  from  the  
point  of  view of  this  study,  we  may  also  see  how urging  people  to  claim an  
explicit deontic stance may function as an effective way for others to refrain 
from recognizing these people’s deontic status; these people are taken away 
the feeling of having deontic rights without always needing to claim them. 
(Stevanovic 2011.) 
 
 
4.4 Justification of an encounter 
As discussed in the previous section, deontic rights can have different origins. 
While some of these origins are relatively stable, such as gender, others are 
more dependent on the specific situational circumstances. Besides, as 
discussed earlier in this study (see Section 3.1.1), there are deontic rights that 
simply arise from the status of a social situation as an encounter—that is from 
the fact that two or more people have jointly ratified each other as authorized 
co-sustainers of a single focus of visual and cognitive attention (Goffman 
1964: 135). Encounters, as natural units of social organization, are permeated 
by constraints that they impose on their participants. For example, the kind 
of embodied organization of participation in an encounter that has been 
referred to as the “ecological huddle” (Goffman 1964: 135-136) is not a matter 
of deliberate choice but, as demonstrated by Goodwin (2007), it has actual 
consequences on how participants orient to each other as moral actors. 
Similarly, in Article 1, I have shown how interactional problems, such as a 
lack  of  response  when  it  would  be  due,  call  for  the  participants’  remedial  
efforts, the aim of which are to maintain the sense of the situation as a whole. 
Importantly, the normative obligations that arise from the status of a social 
situation as an encounter are the same for all its participants. As pointed out 
by Goffman (1961: 71), “an encounter provides a world for its participants”—a 
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“democratic” mini world that is, as it were, independent of the hierarchies of 
the world “out there” (see also Goffman 1983; Drew & Wootton 1988). At the 
same time, however, Goffman also pointed out that the character and 
stability of this mini world is “intimately related to its selective relationship to 
the  wider  one”  (Goffman  1961:  71).  This  raises  the  question  of  how  this  
particular relation operates. How are those normative obligations that arise 
from the status of a social situation as an encounter tied to the normative 
obligations arising from wider social structures? Are there certain “higher 
order” deontic considerations that bear on the emergence of interactional 
encounters  in  the  first  place and, thereby, to the deontic rights that the 
participants in these encounters might have? This is something that I will 
consider next. 
Given the number of normative obligations that any interactional 
encounter creates for its participants, we may assume that there always needs 
to be some kind of legitimate reason for any person to ratify another person 
as a participant in an encounter. While Collins (2004: 373) has argued that 
humans are “emotional energy seekers” and are thus particularly drawn to 
those interactional encounters where they can get the best emotional energy 
payoff, it is also clear that the mere hope for an emotional energy boost is 
something that a person can seldom make use of as an explicit justification 
for an encounter (cf. I  wanted  to  come  to  talk  to  you  because  you  always  
make me feel so good). In other words, even if the “real” reason for 
someone’s willingness to interact with another person were related to the 
anticipated emotional rewards that could be gained through the interaction, 
encounters are usually—more or less explicitly—justified on other grounds, 
such as imbalances with respect  to knowledge (How was your holiday?) or 
practical advantages that the participants can gain from the interaction (I 
think we need to discuss the revisions to our paper). Besides, some 
encounters can be justified with reference to third parties who have defined 
the encounter as obligatory for certain participants (The Chapter demanded 
that we need to have a performance appraisal interview at least once a 
year). 
Now, whatever the exact basis upon which an encounter can be justified 
is, I suggest that this justification may really pertain to what actually happens 
in  the  interaction  then  and  there.  This  idea  is  related  to  what  has  been  
suggested about the influence of the participants’ overall activity framework 
on the types of actions that the participants are likely to perform in their 
interactional  encounter  (Levinson  1992;  see  also  Ryave  1978;  Ford  1999;  
Heath et al. 2000; Vine 2004; 2009). But now, however, my question is not 
about this likelihood per se but  about  its  origins:  why would certain 
participants in specific settings be likely to perform particular types of 
actions? I argue that this is not only to keep the overall activity going (cf. 
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Stivers  &  Robinson  2006)  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  to  maintain  the  
justification of the encounter. If there are no other reasons for the 
participants  to  interact  with  each  other  than  those  reasons  that  have  to  do  
with the participants’ official activity, every departure from that official 
activity in effect undermines the sense of the situation as a whole—as has 
been pointed out in Article 1. But, of course, if there are more reasons for the 
participants  to  spend  time  together  than  just  the  one  associated  with  their  
official activity, they may more freely deviate from the expected course of 
interaction. Hence, it is the exact justification of an encounter which 
determines what the participants should do in order to maintain the sense of 
the situation, but this justification, again, is fundamentally dependent on who 
the participants are to each other. In this way, the justification of an 
encounter can serve as one possible bridge between the two worlds 
mentioned by Goffman: the democratic mini world of the encounter and the 
wider social world with its distinct structures. 
The planning meetings between pastors and cantors are normally 
justified on practical reasons: the participants need to prepare their joint 
work tasks. However, as pointed out earlier, not every church worker regards 
such meetings as necessary: the decisions about hymns and other details of 
upcoming church events can also be made, for example, by the pastors alone, 
who may afterwards inform the cantors about their unilateral decisions. 
Timewise, such a procedure would indeed be quite effective. But what really 
justifies the joint planning meetings between pastors and cantors is the 
anticipation that these meetings will lead to “better” decisions, to the 
emergence of which both the pastors with their theological expertise and the 
cantors with their musical proficiency contribute. Thus, I have suggested, and 
presented empirical evidence, that the justification of the planning meetings 
between pastors and cantors is based on two different kinds of expectations: 
on expectations of epistemic asymmetry and deontic symmetry (see Section 
2.1).  Indeed,  from  this  point  of  view,  we  can  clearly  appreciate  why  the  
pastors and cantors in their joint planning meetings strive so hard to make 
sure that their joint decisions are genuinely joint ones—something that is 
demonstrated in Articles 2-4. 
As pointed out above, the demands that an interactional encounter 
makes  on  its  own  behalf,  such  as  the  obligation  of  joint  involvement  
(Goffman 1957), concerns all its participants in the same way. However, this 
symmetry does not necessarily apply to the maintenance of the justification 
of the encounter—that is, the participants may not always feel equally obliged 
to  engage  in  those  specific  types  of  actions  in  light  of  which  the  encounter  
makes most sense. Indeed, it is relatively common that an encounter has 
been suggested or initiated by one particular person who has more at stake in 
the encounter than those with whom they want to interact with. This person 
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may even have tried to persuade his potential co-participant(s) about the 
necessity of the encounter, for example, by referring to the mutually 
acceptable reasons in light of which the encounter appears important. Now, I 
suggest  that  this  kind  of  a  “higher  order”  asymmetry  may  bear  on  the  
participants’ interactional conduct in the encounter. This happens by 
influencing  the  options  available  for  each  participant:  while  that  person  on  
whose initiative the encounter has taken place has the obligation to prove 
that  the  encounter  is  justified,  others  do  not  have  such  obligations  and  can  
design  their  conduct  more  freely.  As  a  result,  the  participants  have  
fundamentally different deontic statuses to begin with. Hence, it is not only 
the wider structural realities or the local interactional contingencies that have 
an impact on the participants’ deontic statuses but these may also be shaped 
by the simple dynamics of setting up interactional encounters: the one who 
suggests or initiates an encounter is accountable for its success. 
In my data, the participant who usually occupies the most vulnerable 
position with respect to the justification of the encounter is the cantor. 
Unfortunately, I cannot judge whether this is merely because of my choice to 
make my first contact with each parish through the cantor, who recruited 
their co-workers for the study, or whether it reflects a more general pattern in 
the church workplaces. As pointed out earlier, it is possible that some of the 
cantors made use of my study and deployed it as a justification for the joint 
planning meetings that they suggested to the pastors. Whatever the case 
might  be,  there  are  certain  patterns  in  my  data  that  can  be  explained  with  
reference to this particular type of vulnerability. For example, one interesting 
way for the cantors to maintain the symmetrical distribution of the 
participants’  deontic  rights,  and  thus  to  preserve  the  justification  of  the  
encounter, is to display their wholehearted approval of the plans that the 
pastors have presented as unilateral decisions of their own; one such instance 
has  been  described  in  Article  5.  At  the  same  time,  the  pastors  have  the  
opposite tendency to treat the cantors’ proposals as announcements of the 
cantors’ unilateral decisions and thereby—in a most sympathetic way—
indicate that these topics are not worth joint discussion; two cases of this type 
are discussed in Article 3. 
While it seems throughout possible that the justification of an encounter 
could serve as one potential origin of the participants’ deontic rights, further 
research is needed to provide more empirical support for the idea. This kind 
of research involves special challenges: on the one hand, this is because any 
video or audio recording usually starts at the point at which the participants 
have already agreed on their encounter and its justification is thus no longer 
explicitly discussed. On the other hand, this is because all the recordings are 
produced by the prevalence of one major justification that might easily trump 
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other justifications: the recording. To overcome both of these challenges may 
thus necessitate new innovative research methods. 
 
 
4.5 Deontic ticker 
Even if deontic rights may have different origins, one thing is clear: deontic 
rights  do  not  exist  outside  of  people’s  orientations  to  them.  They  are  thus  
ultimately a product of our communication system, where each 
communicative act is understood by reference to what we postulate to be its 
shared, intersubjective context (Tomasello 2008; 2009). This common 
ground is a result of the interplay between a vast number of different kinds of 
ongoing  considerations  at  several  levels  of  social  organization.  At  the  same  
time, it is something that we usually grasp intuitively. The human capabilities 
of  recursive  mind  reading  (I  know  that  you  know  that  I  know  etc.),  role  
reversal imitation (placing myself in your shoes), and sharing attitudes and 
feelings,  are  all  preconditions  for  us  to  be  able  to  see  ourselves  and  others  
from a bird’s eye point of view—something that we need to be able to come to 
conclusions concerning the relative distribution of deontic rights between us.  
I  argue  that  people  are  continuously  computing  the  amount  of  rights  
and obligations that they have in relation to different people, in different 
domains of action, in order to be able to use their deontic statuses as 
interactional resources and to be able to make sense of other people’s 
utterances and expressions as actions. The idea about such a “deontic ticker” 
is, again, analogous to and inspired by Heritage’s insights on epistemics. 
According to Heritage (2012a; 2012c), we may talk about an “epistemic 
ticker” as a basic element of human communication; people continuously 
monitor their epistemic statuses relative to others—that is, they keep a check 
on what they know relative to the other, how they know what they know, and 
assess whether how they know what they know is different from how others 
know these matters. 
Interestingly, Heritage has connected his idea about the epistemic ticker 
to biological and evolutionary research by Dunbar, who has suggested that 
the hominid brain size is  positively correlated with the size of  the groups in 
which hominids have lived and worked (Dunbar 2003; Dunbar & Schultz 
2007). According to Dunbar’s famous “social brain hypothesis,” a larger brain 
is  needed  to  maintain  cooperative  and  solidary  relations  at  the  group  level;  
hominids  that  live  in  larger  groups  have  needed  to  develop  larger  brains  in  
order to be able to deal with the cognitive demands caused by living in large 
groups,  where  individuals  need  to  be  able  to  meet  their  own  requirements,  
while coordinating their behavior with others, so as to defuse the direct and 
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indirect  conflicts  that  could  be  generated  by  foraging  in  the  same  space  
(Dunbar  &  Schultz  2007:  1345).  Thus,  Heritage  has  suggested  that  some of  
these cognitive demands may well have been of epistemic nature. 
What can then be said about the cognitive demands of deontic nature? 
While epistemic considerations can be seen as characteristic of human 
communication,16 we  may  ask  whether  the  same  applies  also  for  deontic  
considerations. Or could it be that deontic considerations are more 
primordial  and  primitive  than  epistemic  ones?  Is  it  possible  that  we  share  
them with other animals? The degree of hierarchy that prevails for bonobos, 
gorillas,  and  chimpanzees  (Boehm  1999),  as  well  as  for  animals  other  than  
apes (Chase 1974), could be seen to indicate that. But even if there were some 
sort of deontic considerations among lower animals as well, we still need to 
remain sensitive to the very special nature of human deontic considerations. 
As an example, we may consider Tomasello’s point about the fundamental 
difference between the human and ape forms of recruiting others for their 
own purposes: 
 
The difference [between humans and apes] is that instead of ordering the other what 
to do, humans often do something more gentle like requesting help (from someone 
who likes helping). That is, unlike ape imperatives, human imperatives can range from 
orders to polite requests to suggestions and hints, depending most fundamentally on 
the degree to which a cooperative attitude may be assumed of the recipient (italics 
mine). (Tomasello 2008: 84) 
 
The essential difference between humans and apes, in other words, lies in the 
fact that human deontic considerations are deeply anchored in the human 
communication system, which, as suggested by Tomasello (2008; 2009), is 
fundamentally cooperative, though people may also manage the exact 
amount of cooperation that they undertake and expect from others in each 
case. In this study, I have argued that people’s judgments about their own 
and each other’s deontic statuses play a central role: a person with a high 
deontic  status  may  count  on  others’  cooperation  more  than  a  person  with  a  
low deontic  status.  Thereby,  my  study  highlights  the  significance  of  face-to-
face interaction as a locus of social order, where both the local and wider 
aspects of social organization pertain to people’s interactional conduct. 
 
  
                                                        
16 For  instance,  according  to  Tomasello  (2009:  15),  while  human  infants  are  capable  of  
understanding informative pointing, apes point “mainly to get humans to fetch food for 
them.” Even ape alarm calls, as Tomasello (2009: 18-19) points out, are not generated by an 
informative intent but, more likely, by an attempt to recruit others to attack the predator. 
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